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Increasing numbers of people are subscribing to location-based services, but as the 
popularity grows so are the privacy concerns. Varieties of research exist to address these privacy 
concerns. Each technique tries to address different models with which location-based services 
respond to subscribers. In this work, we present ideas to address privacy concerns for the two 
main models namely: the snapshot nearest neighbor query model and the continuous nearest 
neighbor query model.  
First, we address snapshot nearest neighbor query model where location-based services 
response represents a snapshot of point in time. In this model, we introduce a novel idea based 
on the concept of an open set in a topological space where points belongs to a subset called 
neighborhood of a point. We extend this concept to provide anonymity to real objects where each 
object belongs to a disjointed neighborhood such that each neighborhood contains a single 
object. To help identify the objects, we implement a database which dynamically scales in direct 
proportion with the size of the neighborhood. To retrieve information secretly and allow the 
database to expose only requested information, private information retrieval protocols are 
executed twice on the data. Our study of the implementation shows that the concept of a single 
object neighborhood is able to efficiently scale the database with the objects in the area. 
The size of the database grows with the size of the grid and the objects covered by the 
location-based services. Typically, creating neighborhoods, computing distances between objects 
in the area, and running private information retrieval protocols causes the CPU to respond slowly 




concept of kernel and parallel computing in GPU. We develop GPU parallel implementation of 
the snapshot query to handle large number of objects. In our experiment, we exploit parameter 
tuning. The results show that with parameter tuning and parallel computing power of GPU we 
are able to significantly reduce the response time as the number of objects increases. To 
determine response time of an application without knowledge of the intricacies of GPU 
architecture, we extend our analysis to predict GPU execution time. We develop the run time 
equation for an operation and extrapolate the run time for a problem set based on the equation, 
and then we provide a model to predict GPU response time. 
As an alternative, the snapshot nearest neighbor query privacy problem can be addressed 
using secure hardware computing which can eliminate the need for protecting the rest of the sub-
system, minimize resource usage and network transmission time. In this approach, a secure 
coprocessor is used to provide privacy. We process all information inside the coprocessor to 
deny adversaries access to any private information. To obfuscate access pattern to external 
memory location, we use oblivious random access memory methodology to access the server. 
Experimental evaluation shows that using a secure coprocessor reduces resource usage and query 
response time as the size of the coverage area and objects increases. 
Second, we address privacy concerns in the continuous nearest neighbor query model 
where location-based services automatically respond to a change in object’s location. In this 
model, we present solutions for two different types known as moving query static object and 
moving query moving object. For the solutions, we propose plane partition using a Voronoi 




continuous nearest neighbor relationship between the points of interest in a path. Specifically, 
space filling curve results in multi-dimensional to 1-dimensional object mapping where values 
are assigned to the objects based on proximity. To prevent subscribers from issuing a query each 
time there is a change in location and to reduce the response time, we introduce the concept of 
transition and update time to indicate where and when the nearest neighbor changes. We also 
introduce a database that dynamically scales with the size of the objects in a path to help obscure 
and relate objects. By executing the private information retrieval protocol twice on the data, the 
user secretly retrieves requested information from the database. The results of our experiment 
show that using plane partitioning and a fractal space filling curve to create nearest neighbor 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Advancement in mobile technology and wireless communication has provided 
opportunities for developers to create complex applications. This new computing paradigm is 
driven by the high-powered GPS enable mobile devices with location information access 
capability. Examples of this type of application includes: (1) the store locator application 
described in [1] that allows users to quickly find store location with the help of location 
intelligence; (2) the proximity-based marketing which allows companies to send advertisements 
to individuals within a specific geographic location; (3) the travel information application that 
updates subscribers with traffic or weather information. Other examples include the nearest 
neighbor locator which allows users to locate nearest point of interest (POI), and the reverse 911 
used to alert subscribers in times of emergencies. These types of applications are referred to as 
location-based services (LBS) and are growing in popularity and becoming ubiquitous. 
LBS-Nearest Neighbor Query  
Location-based services are information and entertainment services that are accessible 
through portable device and mobile network. LBS providers deliver the service through user 
mobile device using the base transceiver station (BTS) that the mobile device is communicating 
with [2], or by the more accurate global positioning system (GPS) satellite. In [2], the services 
were classified into push and pull. In push, users within target areas receive solicitation from 
advertisers or solicitors without requesting. Some examples are: (1) shoppers in a department 




international trip informed of a discounted international phone plan when within the international 
terminal of the airport.  
In a pull system, user actively requests information before receiving it. For example, a 
traveler driving through a city may decide to spend the night in the city and requests for the 
nearest lodging place. Other examples include visitors to an area who wish to dine on an ethnic 
cuisine and requests for the specific nearest ethnic restaurant, or a commuter walking around 
searching for the nearest taxi. Specifically, user issues a query referred to as nearest neighbor 
query (NNQ) to the LBS provider requesting for the nearest POI to their location. LBS responds 
in one of two types of NNQ called snapshot or continuous nearest neighbor query. Snapshot 
nearest neighbor query (SNNQ) is the response to a user query that represents a snapshot of a 
point in time. Basically, user issues a query to the LBS requesting for the nearest POI, when the 
nearest POI changes, another query is required from the user. Continuous nearest neighbor query 
(CNNQ) on the other hand is the response that continuously updates the user with the nearest 
POI as the user location or the nearest POI changes without another query from the user. To 
customize the service, user has to disclose some personal information. Though LBS have 
provided convenience and information access that is unimaginable years ago; nevertheless, 
privacy advocates have raised concerns on the negative fallout from a possible collusion between 
LBS provider and an adversary. Some users will be reluctant to use the service for fear that doing 
so will compromise their personal information and expose them to danger, embarrassment or 
reprisal. Therefore, protecting user personal information is necessary for these types of services. 




Protecting Private Information in LBS-NNQ 
Nearest neighbor query is a query issued in order to locate the nearest POI assuming the 
objects are statically or dynamically restricted within the edges of a spatial network 𝑆𝑁. A user 
that wish to receive from the LBS the nearest POI to its location within the SN has to disclose to 
the LBS together with the service request (SR) message the raw position information which will 
allow the LBS to customize the request. If for instance a user SR message is represented as 
SR(23.53’28”N, 71. 42’36”W,q(i)) which contains user location (23.53’28”N, 71.42’36”W) and 
desired information q(i), SR exposes the raw position data of the user. An untrustworthy provider 
or third party intermediary can collaborate with adversary to misuse this information. NNQ is 
considered private if a user such as Alice issues a query to request for the nearest casino to her 
location and Bob is unable to determine Alice’s location or information she requested. This 
requires that Alice location and desired information remains anonymous to all parties. Providing 
anonymity to user private information is a challenge, but it has been receiving lots of attention 
from researchers. Interestingly, SNNQ and CNNQ pose different challenges when it comes to 
protecting user private information. It is important to note that privacy requirement varies for 
different users and type of information desired. For instance, a user looking for the nearest gas 
station may have different privacy requirement from a user looking for the nearest gambling 





Providing Privacy in SNNQ 
In a SNNQ, a user device issues a query to the LBS server requesting the nearest POI 
such as a gas station, restaurant or hospital. Server responds to the user request and terminates 
the session. As the nearest POI changes due to a change in the user or the POI location, the user 
does not receive update. Any update due to a change in location will require that the user issue 
another query. To protect private information of the user, several proposals like [3] assume the 
existence of other k -1 users with similar profiles as the target user which allows the system to 
aggregate the queries in order to obscure the profile of the target user. Other methods rely on the 
honesty of the server or third party [4], while some of the methods release too many database 
information to the user and therefore require the user to filter through the data to find its nearest 
POI as in [5]. While each of these solutions has proven to be effective, we found various 
limitations to the techniques. For instance, a query may never be answered for lack of existence 
of other k -1 users in the target area. Also, releasing large amount of database information 
engages resources longer than may be desired, and LBS may not want to release too many of 
their valuable information if there is no financial benefit. To address this, we introduce space 
mapping model based on abstracting the concept of an open set in a topological space where 
points in the space belongs to a subset called neighborhood of a point. We combine it with a 
database design that dynamically scales in direct proportion with size of the object to help a user 
relate a position with the location of information in the database. We execute private information 




minimize the amount of information released. The design allows us to scale the database server 
based on the size of the area and number of objects for performance. 
Contributions 
The main contributions are summarized as follows:  
1. We propose a new model to protect user private information based on abstraction of sets 
in a topological space as a solution to cloaking and reliability on a server or third party. 
2. We propose to scale the database in direct proportion with the size of the object to 
obscure and relate object position with information in the database. 
3. We provide experimental evaluation of our proposal with respect to the execution time 
and complexity to show feasibility and scalability of the methodology and compare the 
complexity with related work. 
Parallel Implementation of a Private SNNQ 
The increasing popularity of LBS-NNQ results in rapid increase in the number of 
subscribers and information processed. This increase results in the growth of the size of the 
database. Usually, the security protocol used to encrypt the data, creating neighborhoods, 
computing distances between objects in the area causes the CPU to respond slowly with the 
increase in database. A faster computation mechanism therefore is required to support this 
growth. Interestingly, several researches address this issue by implementing multi-threading in a 




can be derived from it. We propose to use the array of streaming multiprocessors (SM) in 
graphical processing unit (GPU) and the inherent parallel computation capability of the GPU to 
reduce the processing time. To do that, we exploit computation sharing by running operation in 
parallel where necessary to reduce computational workload and speed up the computation. The 
challenge in GPU computing is to find enough parallelism in the algorithm that will account for 
the transfer overhead between the CPU and the GPU device.  
Contributions 
The main contributions are as follows:  
1. We propose to use the streaming multiprocessors of GPU and the parallel computing 
platform and programming model of compute unified device architecture (CUDA) to 
address the increase in response time as the size of the database increases. 
2. We provide experimental evaluation of our parallel implementation and compare with 
CPU serial implementation to show the speedup of GPU over CPU. 
3. We conduct performance evaluation of the GPU, and then provide analysis and model to 
predict GPU execution time. 
Providing Privacy in SNNQ with Tamper-Resistant Hardware 
As an alternative to space mapping and to minimize resource usage and network 
transmission time, we explore hardware approach by using secure coprocessor (SC) computing 




shown in [7] to assist privacy. This approach can support traditional query and can have lower 
overhead. Secure coprocessor is a tamper-resistant hardware device designed such that upon a 
break-in the intruder cannot learn or change the internal state except through normal I/O 
channels or by forcibly resetting the entire secure coprocessor. Lately, there has been significant 
research on using this method to protect data; however, most are implemented to protect data in a 
cloud computing environment. The work in [8] and [9] set up a secure channel between user and 
trusted processor to transmit data. However, the solution fails to prevent leakage of information 
that could assist adversary to determine the type of memory access, memory location accessed, 
or what data is read or written by the client. Proposal in [10] seem effective but only hides user’s 
location.  
We propose to use secure coprocessor in LBS-SNNQ to protect both user location and 
information accessed. We propose to implement oblivious random access memory (ORAM) 
methodology to obfuscate database access pattern. ORAM is a probabilistic random access 
memory (RAM) with a memory access pattern that allows a client to obscure its access pattern to 
a remote storage server. The secure coprocessor accesses LBS server through the ORAM 
methodology and secretly computes user desired information and then exchange encrypted 
information with the user.  
Contributions 




1. We propose to process user query using secure coprocessor to hide both user location and 
information accessed and minimize size of data transferred. 
2. We propose to access LBS server using ORAM methodology to obfuscate database 
access pattern. 
3. We provide analysis of the emulation of the secure coprocessor to show improved 
performance over software approach as the size of the object increases. 
Providing Privacy in CNNQ 
In a spatial network the position of a mobile object will change as the object moves from 
one point to another. Depending on the trajectory or the object motion, the change may lead to a 
change in the nearest POI to a user position. For a user to issue a query each time a change 
occurs will be inefficient. CNNQ supports this mobility, that is, user device issues a query for the 
nearest POI, server responds to the initial request, but also continues to update the user with the 
most current nearest POI as the user or the POI location changes. Processing private nearest 
neighbor query for a moving object is not an easy task. Proposals in [11], [12], [13] and [14] 
have been suggested to find nearest neighbor but with no consideration on user privacy. While 
these suggestions were effective and extends the research in the area of CNNQ, users in LBS-
CNNQ still runs the risk of having their private data exposed which can be misused by 
adversaries. Solutions based on snapshot query as some researchers suggested will be cost 
prohibitive as the frequency of the changes increases. Proposal in [15] introduces privacy 
technique for LBS-CNNQ, though effective, it works like SNNQ. As stated in [11] and [16], it is 




as in SNNQ. The problem gets more complex when we consider that the mobility of the objects 
involved can affect relationships in a CNNQ. This relationship leads to what is referred as 
mobile query static object (MQSO) (e.g. a user searching for the nearest gas station while driving 
through a city), moving query moving object (MQMO) (e.g. a user driving through a town 
searching for nearest friend who may be driving through the town), and static query mobile 
object (SQMO) (e.g. a user at a bus station searching for the nearest bus to the station). In our 
work, we only consider MQSO and MQMO.  
In MQSO-CNNQ, the user (query) is dynamic while the object (POI) is static. If for 
instance, the nearest neighbor to a user at a location l is 𝑝1, and 𝑝1is the POI, as the user moves 
to another location l’, its nearest neighbor at this location may change depending solely on the 
motion and trajectory of the user.  
In MQMO-CNNQ, both the user and the POI are dynamic within a spatial network. If the 
nearest POI to a user at a location l is 𝑝1 the nearest POI at a future location l’ depends on the 
trajectory and motion of both the user and the POI. Location of the user and the POI can change 
simultaneously. POI location is only known to the server at time t. To guarantee that server 
returns nearest POI, the location of the POI at a future time t’ should also be known by the 
server. Server cannot be updated offline as in MQSO due to the possibility of a change in the 
POI location after a query has been initiated. In order for server to continuously respond with the 
precise POI, the location of the query and the POI at time t and t’ must be known. Given the 
frequency of updates that may be involved in this type of query, privacy technique used in 




SNNQ, large amount of information has to be exchanged between the user and the server 
throughout the query segment. 
As a solution, we propose plane partitioning using Voronoi diagram to bind objects in a 
region, and use continuous fractal space filling curve to determine proximity and create 
relationships between the objects in a path. We also implement a database that dynamically 
adjusts to match the size of the objects in the path. We also execute PIR protocol twice on the 
data to secretly retrieve the information and minimize the amount of information released. 
Contributions  
Our contributions to private CNNQ are as follows: 
1. We propose plane partitioning and continuous fractal space filling curve using Voronoi 
diagram and Hilbert curve order to create nearest neighbor relationship through a path. 
2. We treat object location as a function of time and introduce the concept of transition and 
update time that indicates where and when a nearest neighbor will change to deal with 
inefficiencies of multiple queries caused by the constant changes in object location. 
3. We provide experimental evaluation with respect to complexity and network 
communication time to show an efficient scalable design. 
4. We implement previous work and compare the response time with our design to show 




Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of the work is organized as follows: In chapter 2, we review related works 
starting with existing approaches to privacy in LBS-SNNQ. We then discuss the direction taken 
by researchers to reduce the response time in a NNQ. We discuss works on alternative method of 
privacy using hardware, and finally in chapter 2, we present previous works on privacy in LBS-
CNNQ. In chapter 3, we explore privacy technique in LBS-SNNQ starting with the problem 
definition. We then present the model for our solution and implementation. We follow with 
experimental evaluation. In chapter 4, we discuss parallel computing using GPU and CUDA 
architecture to address the increase in response time in the SNNQ due to the increase in the size 
of the database, and then follow with our implementation of the SNNQ. We then conduct 
experimental analysis to compare serial and parallel implementation of our proposal. Then, we 
present GPU Run-time modelling for the snapshot query. In chapter 5, we explore the idea of a 
tamper-resistant hardware using secure coprocessor computation to protect private information in 
LBS. We discuss the experimental evaluation and compare with software approach. Chapter 6 
discusses LBS-CNNQ and presents our privacy solutions for MQSO and MQMO types of 
CNNQ. We follow with experimental analysis of the implementation. We then implement related 
work and compare with our design. Then, we present analysis on the impact of large prime in 





CHAPTER TWO: RELATED WORKS 
In this chapter, we review relevant works on private LBS-NNQ and other works on data 
privacy and parallel computing. We start by presenting previous privacy techniques on LBS-
SNNQ. We follow with work on parallel implementation of a NNQ. We then discuss alternative 
approach to privacy using tamper-resistant hardware and then finish with work done on LBS-
CNNQ. 
Snapshot Nearest Neighbor Query 
As stated in [17], three main models are used to protect user private information in LBS-
NNQ. Among them are: two-tier spatial transformation, three-tier spatial transformation and 
cryptographic technique.  
Two-tier spatial transformation approach provides direct communication between user 
and the LBS. It is mostly implemented through technique like k-anonymity. In this model, the 
LBS are prevented from distinguishing user query from other k-1 queries by generalizing the 
query. Shin et al [18] designed two-tier system based on anonymizing user profile. User specifies 
the extent that location and profile information should be generalized such that the generalized 
area includes at least other k-1 users with identical profile as the user. This will prevent the LBS 
from determining the exact query origin. Another two-tier approach was proposed in [3], [4] and 
[19]. In these techniques user specifies the minimum level of anonymity desired, the desired 
maximum spatial and temporal resolution, and the acceptable waiting interval. If other k-1 users 
exist in the region within this interval, all the queries will be combined into a cloaking region and 




interval, the user query will be dropped. Cloaking region was proposed in [20] to increase the 
location privacy of the user at additional computation. The problem with these techniques is the 
dependency on other queries and large coverage area. There is no guarantee that another query 
will exist in the region within the time interval, and even when they exist the profile may be 
substantially different than that of the target query. Therefore, there is a possibility the query 
may go unanswered.  
Three-tier spatial transformation is another way to protect user private information in 
LBS. As implemented in [21] and also in [4] using a trusted third party, user communicates 
directly with the trusted server which then redacts user information before transmitting to LBS. 
Kalnis et al. [22] proposed three-tier idea by using trusted anonymizer. The trusted anonymizer 
collects user current location and anonymizes the query before sending to LBS. User locations 
are sorted and grouped using Hilbert Space-filling curve order. Each user can decide level of 
anonymity required ranging from 1 (no privacy required) to user cardinality (maximum privacy). 
Idea that allows the entire mobile node to communicate with external server through a central 
anonymity server was proposed in [23]. The central server is part of the trusted computing base. 
During initialization, mobile nodes will set up authenticated encryption connection with the 
anonymity server. The anonymity server will then decrypt the message, removes any identifiers, 
and distorts the position data according to the prescribed cloaking algorithm to reduce the re-
identification risk. However, these techniques rely on total honesty of the third party server and 




Another technique used in LBS-NNQ to protect user private information is cryptography. 
This model is implemented through encryption of user information. Cryptography in most cases 
provides direct communication between user and LBS sever thereby eliminating the need for a 
third party. It encrypts user query prior to sending to the server. A hybrid technique combining 
oblivious transfer (OT) and homomorphic encryption to protect user location information and 
user profile was proposed in [24]. It introduced a proxy party that interacts with multiple services 
and collects payment from subscribed users. The proxy then distributes the money to the services 
on behalf of the users without the proxy or the services learning the exact relationship between 
user and LBS. Since this protocol uses a proxy, privacy depends on the honesty of the proxy. The 
focus of [25] is on improving the work of [24]. The authors use OT twice to eliminate the need 
for a proxy. It requires multiple LBS providers to coordinate with a central server. It uses 
symmetric encryption which makes it hard for key management as number of users increase.  
The most relevant to our approach is the method proposed in [5] and [26]. The technique 
is based on the design of a database represented as a square matrix of size n and PIR protocol 
that relies on quadratic residuousity assumption (QRA). User encrypts its request to the server. 
Server runs PIR protocol on user request and responds to the user. The user decrypts the 
response using prior knowledge of some large prime. However, as used in [5], it reveals too 
many information to the user. It also increases transmission time and user computation.  
Our proposal is based on the single database design and computational private 
information retrieval (cPIR) protocol of [27]. We use space mapping technique that creates 




twice to minimize the amount of information released by returning only the requested 
information to the user. It also reduces the server transmission and user computation cost.  
Parallel Computing in a Nearest Neighbor Query 
Increase in the number of LBS subscribers result in increase in the information processed 
by the LBS and subsequently increase in the size of the database. Finding distances between 
points, sorting computed distances, selecting reference points, searching and updating locations, 
query processing on Voronoi-based index, and a host of other technique used in nearest neighbor 
search can be computational intensive as a result of this increase. Several parallel 
implementations have been suggested to reduce this computational burden involved in 
processing nearest neighbor query. CPU multicore architecture was proposed in [28] where the 
architecture has a primary site and a number of secondary sites. The relevant sites are activated 
simultaneously. It traverses R-trees in parallel to collect the most promising nearest neighbor. 
The upper tree level is maintained in the primary site, while the leaves and corresponding data 
objects are stored in the secondary sites. The efficiency measure was the response time of a 
given query. However, this method may not be ideal for LBS private query since computation is 
distributed among multiple sites. In [6], database search of age-wise groups similar to k-NN 
search was performed on a desktop using multicore processor to take full advantage of parallel 
programming. While computation cost can be significantly reduced through multithreading in a 
multicore CPU; nevertheless, the limited number of cores in average CPU limits the 
improvement that can be achieved through multithreading. GPU provides the needed 




algorithm exploiting the multiple cores and data parallelism to achieve linear space and time 
complexity. In [30], NVIDIA CUDA API was used in k-NN.  
Our proposal is similar to [30] leveraging GPU inherent parallel computation capability 
and CUDA API to reduce the computational burden in SNNQ as a result of the increase in 
database size. We took advantage of the independent of the data points to maximize the 
parallelization. We experimented with parameter tuning to determine a more efficient parameter 
size for GPU computation. The algorithm is split between CPU and GPU. The part where the 
output data points cannot be represented without relation to each other is implemented on the 
CPU, while the part where the output data is independent is implemented on the GPU. The 
massive reduction in the GPU computation compensates for the data transmission between CPU 
and GPU thereby reducing the overall run time. 
Tamper-Resistant Hardware Private Data Computation 
Alternative technique to protect private information is to use tamper-resistant hardware. 
Several tamper-resistant hardware techniques have been proposed to protect private information. 
In [7], it was shown that privacy can be achieved using commercially available coprocessor 
through algorithm that both provides asymptotically optimal performance and also promises 
reasonable performance in real implementations. A prototype that gives reasonable performance 
on dataset sizes up to about 10, 000 was implemented in [31]. In [32], diverse tools that ranged 
from ORAM to switching networks and the snort network intrusion detection system (NIDS) 
were used to build a trusted computing secure hardware that enhanced client privacy. Tamper 




proposed in [8] and [9]. It works by a user setting up a secure channel with a trusted coprocessor. 
This approach has been stated to perform better than cryptographic technique [33]. However, 
none of these techniques was implemented for LBS private query. Also, some of them do not 
prevent information leakage that could assist adversary to determine the type of memory access 
which could lead to revealing information accessed. In [10] and [34], idea of a trusted platform 
module (TPM) using secure hardware-aided PIR to provide privacy in LBS was proposed. User 
sends encrypted location information to query scheduler. The scheduler forwards the encrypted 
information to the TPM who decrypts the message and then uses PIR to retrieve information 
form LBS database. It encrypts the request and sends back to the user. This proposal does not 
prevent disclosure of the information accessed. It only hides the location. It also does not hide 
access pattern which can leak information that may compromise location privacy. A proposal 
that uses SC to encrypt and shuffle the entire database was implemented in [35]. SC blindly 
retrieves user request from the database and encrypts it before sending it back to the user. It then 
stores the information in a cache. Each subsequent request is first checked in the cache before 
accessing the database to prevent the server from deciphering information accessed based on 
consecutive query. However, cache can quickly fill up. It also focuses on location privacy and 
not requested information privacy.  
We explore tamper resistant hardware as an alternative to protect private information in 
LBS-SNNQ. Specifically, we use secure coprocessor to perform operation on a user request. The 
SC and the user encrypt their information before transmitting. The SC accesses database 
information using path ORAM of [36]. This technique optimizes the system by focusing on a 




Continuous Nearest Neighbor Query 
Several solutions including [15] have been suggested to prevent query from divulging 
user private information in CNNQ. The proposal partitions area into cells using Voronoi graph. 
The contents of each cell form cooperative group with centered common server (CS). User sends 
request to CS. The CS takes its own location and a neighbor CS location that the user is heading 
to as two anchor points and chooses other continuous anchors in the line segment between them. 
The CS organizes users to form cooperative k-anonymity group according to their moving trend, 
it removes user identity and actual location, and then sends request to LBS. The CS sends each 
snapshot query of continuous query request with an anchor which the user has not yet passed. 
The problem with this technique is that it issues query at each segment of the anchor point. It 
also depends on third party which may not be trustworthy and can provide single point of failure. 
Another downside is that it depends on other users having similar moving pattern. A design that 
issues query based on pre-determined uniformly distributed static point was proposed in [37]. It 
finds the vertex of a cloaked area and the nearest static point to the vertex, and then finds the 
nearest object to the static query point as an approximate answer for the vertex. It repeats the 
same process when the nearest neighbor changes. This technique works like snapshot query. The 
query response will be approximate and not exact nearest neighbor. Also, privacy depends on 
third party anonymizer. Chow and Mokbel in [38] propose k-sharing region. A cloaked spatial 
region contains at least k users, and the region is also shared by at least k of these users. Query is 
issued based on the cumulative cloaked region which will stop adversary from linking query to a 




LBS. It will also be difficult to maintain exactly k users in the entire cloaked region; therefore, 
query may never be answered.  
We propose idea that combines Voronoi diagram and Hilbert curve order to create 
nearest neighbor relationships. We then create transition time to determine the point where 
nearest neighbor will change. Server runs PIR protocol of [27] on user request and creates a data 
queue in increasing order. At each transition point, server pops data from the queue and updates 





CHAPTER THREE: PROVIDING PRIVACY IN LBS-SNNQ 
This chapter presents the details of our proposed technique to protect private information 
in LBS-SNNQ. The problem definition is such that given points of interests 𝑃 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, ⋯ , 𝑝𝑛} 
where n is the number of p contained in an area A and 𝑝𝑖 is a single POI. If a user u positioned in 
a location 𝑙 which is inside 𝐴 issues a query to receive the nearest 𝑝 from LBS, a private SNNQ 
should allow LBS server to return to the user u located in l a p whose distance to u is ≤ to all 
other (𝑃 − 𝑝𝑖) ∈ 𝐴 without revealing the l or the 𝑝𝑖 to the server or any other party. 
Anonymizing user private information based on cloaking a region as in [3] is an effective way to 
implement private query in LBS-SNNQ. Nevertheless, the growing popularity of LBS has led to 
increase in the size of area and objects covered. This growth will lead to a rise in the amount of 
information in the database which may increase database response time. We view this problem 
as one that can be represented as points in a Hausdorff space where each point belongs to a 
subset and the database scaled to the size of the subset in the space.  
Specifically, we address the issue by adopting the concept of points in a set where each 
point belongs to a subset called neighborhood of the point that satisfies Hausdorff axioms of 
topological space. A space is said to be Hausdorff if for any two distinct points in a topological 
space there exists disjoint open sets containing the two points. Neighborhood of a point is a set 
containing the point where the point can be moved some amount without leaving the set. We 
abstract this concept to create object space where object space represents an area A which 




Solution for SNNQ 
The idea is to impose a √𝑛  𝑥 √𝑛 grid G over a target area and then map the objects in the 
grid such that each object is contained in its own neighborhood, and then scale the database to 
the size of the neighborhoods in the area. Since a user is located in one of the neighborhoods, a 
user position can be related with location of information in the database. This will allow the 
database server to return to the user the exact nearest object contained in the same neighborhood 
with the user without revealing location information or any other POI.  
To help explain our design methodology, we first define Hausdorff axiom of topological 
space. Hausdorff space is a topological space if any two distinct points in the space can be 
separated into disjoint neighborhoods. A set S is considered a topological space if each point x ∈ 
S assigned to a non-empty family of subsets of S called the neighborhood U of x satisfies the 
following axioms: 
1. Each point x belongs to a neighborhood, i.e., x ∈ 𝑈. 
2. Any set which contains a neighborhood of a point is a neighborhood of that point, i.e., 
every superset of a neighborhood of a point x ∈ S is a neighborhood of x.  
3. The intersection of any two neighborhoods of a point is a neighborhood of that point. 
4. Any neighborhood 𝑈 of x contains a neighborhood W of x such that 𝑈 is a neighborhood 
of each point in W  
We extend this concept to our object space. We first define the object space in terms of a set O, 
where O is the set for all the p contained in A. We also define 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, ⋯ , 𝑣𝑚}  to be the 




{𝑁𝐻𝐷1 , 𝑁𝐻𝐷2 , ⋯ , 𝑁𝐻𝐷𝑘} subsets of 𝑉 to be the neighborhood of a 𝑝. Each 𝑝 ∈ 𝑂 belongs to a 
subset called neighborhood 𝑁𝐻𝐷 of 𝑝.  
Neighborhood Creation 
The design is based on dividing an area into neighborhoods that contains the objects in 
the area such that each neighborhood contains only one object. We first map an area A into a 
square grid G of cells c similar to Ghinita et al. in [5], and we assign identification number to 
each c (A is the area covered by the LBS, while G is the grid imposed over the area, and c is the 
grid cells). Figure 1 is an example of an area mapped into a 4x4 grid and a cell within the grid 
containing 4 POIs. The user u is contained in one of the grid cell. For this example, each c in the 
grid must contain 4 POIs and will be padded if necessary to maintain a cell of size 4. Each c is 
identified with a unique identifier. The cells c from 𝑐1, 𝑐2, ⋯ , 𝑐𝑛(n represents the size of the grid) 
are assigned the value of a unique identifier 𝐶𝐼𝑑, i.e., 𝑐1 = 𝐶𝐼𝑑1 , 𝑐2 = 𝐶𝐼𝑑2 , and 𝑐𝑛 = 𝐶𝐼𝑑𝑛. 
 





Each 𝑣 is divided into neighborhoods 𝑁𝐻𝐷 that satisfy Hausdorff space such that each p has its 
own neighborhood and ∀𝑁𝐻𝐷 ∃! 𝑝 ∈ 𝑁𝐻𝐷.  
We let the separation distance of 𝑝 which is represented as Sd(𝑝) (distance from 𝑝 to the end 
point of its 𝑁𝐻𝐷) be 
𝐷𝐼
2
, where DI is the diameter of the area of the 𝑁𝐻𝐷. For each 𝑁𝐻𝐷 and 𝑝 we 
assign location data 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷 and 𝑙𝑝 respectively based on the geographical coordinate of the area of 
the neighborhood and the POI. Each p ∈ 𝑣𝑖 is assigned the coordinate location data (𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷) of the 
NHD that contains it to prevent a user from identifying the exact location of the objects in the 
area.  
      ∴ 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷𝑗(𝑝𝑖)⇒ 𝑙𝑝𝑖  
However, since 𝑁𝐻𝐷𝑗≇𝑝𝑖, 
      ∴ 𝑙𝑝𝑖  ⇏ 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷𝑗(𝑝𝑖) 
Each 𝑁𝐻𝐷  is associated with a c. The 𝑁𝐻𝐷 is identified by the CId of the containing c and the 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷 
of the 𝑁𝐻𝐷. Since 𝑁𝐻𝐷  is represented by 𝐶𝐼𝑑 and 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷 so is the 𝑝 contained in the 𝑁𝐻𝐷, i.e. 
    𝑁𝐻𝐷𝑖 = f(𝐶𝐼𝑑𝑖, 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷𝑗) ⇒ 𝑝𝑖 = f(𝐶𝐼𝑑𝑖, 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷𝑗) 
but not vice versa. The p is now related to its 𝑁𝐻𝐷. For example and as shown in Figure 2, if 
restaurant 𝑅1 in a cell with a 𝐶𝐼𝑑 of 64 is contained in 𝑁𝐻𝐷 with a location data of 28.8 and 77.0 
obtained from the conversion of the spherical coordinate of 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷 to decimal degree, the 𝑅1will be 
assigned the value 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷and identified as 𝑅1(64, 28.8, 77.0). It is also assigned an integer t (t 




number of POI in a cell. The entire restaurant in the cell will be identified with the same 𝐶𝐼𝑑 and 
their respective t value together with 𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷  of their respective neighborhood. The restaurant 𝑅1 for 
t = 1 will therefore be identified as 𝑅1(64, +1, 28.8, 77.0). 
This information is stored in the database which aligns with G such that the database tuples are 
stored in a matching order with G. 
 
 
Figure 2 Identifying objects with their cell id and location data 
Database Design 
Our database design is similar to the work of [5] and [26] using single database design 
proposed in [27]. The design is such that the tuples are stored in a manner that will allow a user 
to relate the position with the location of information in the database. The database D is of size 
n-bit binary string and represented as a square matrix 𝑀 =  √𝑛  𝑥 √𝑛 and indexed by 𝐷𝑖, 
where 𝐷 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, ⋯ 𝑝𝑛}. 𝑀𝑎,𝑏 is the matrix element corresponding to 𝐷𝑖, where a and b is 
the index for the matrix row and column respectively. To prevent inference from the number of 




to m matrices M[1] , M[2] , M[3]. . .M[m] one for each bit of the object in a cell. The 
computation cost for this will be O(mn). Objects in the grid are aligned with information in the 
database. Each cell can contain multiple objects; therefore, the same concept is applied for k 
objects in a cell. In this case 𝑀𝑎,𝑏will correspond to 𝐷𝑖𝑗→𝑘, where j is from 1 to k, and (k = 1) 
⇒𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 𝐷𝑖. Each neighborhood contains a single object which is equivalent to m
k
 matrices (M[1] 
, (M[2]) , (M[3]) . . . , (M[m]))
k
 one for each bit of the object in a neighborhood. This will bring 
the computation cost to O(mn)
k
. The design is such that the database can be scaled with the size 
of the objects for performance. User will request for the i-th bit value of D.  
Private Information Retrieval 
When a user wants to find the i-th bit value of Di, to maintain privacy, the user will send 
encrypted query q(i) to the LBS server. Server will run PIR protocol on user request and 
responds with r(𝐷𝑖) where r is used for encryption. User will compute Di from r(𝐷𝑖) to determine 
i. PIR is a protocol that allows a user to retrieve and interpret the value of the information 
retrieved from a database without revealing the exact information retrieved. Different flavors 
have been proposed over the years. The earlier version introduced in [39] requires replication of 
database. In our work, we explore computational private information retrieval (cPIR) protocol 
introduced by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky in [27] which requires single database tuple 
distribution. It is based on the premise that there is no known function in polynomial bounded 
time that will allow a database of size n to differentiate between queries for i-th
 
bit and j-th 




the running time of the encryption and decryption including adversary algorithms is bounded by 
some polynomial function in k.  
The PIR scheme is such that for a database D of n bit string from which a user wishes to 
obtain bit Di while keeping secret index i from the database it requires that the user query divulge 
no information about i. As described in [27], cPIR is based on Quadratic Residuosity Assumption 
(QRA). Goldwasser and Bellare used QRA in [40], and it states that it has become 
computationally infeasible to determine the quadratic residues in modulo arithmetic of a large 
composite number N = q*q’, where q, q’ are large primes. For instance, if N is a natural number 
define 
ℤ∗𝐍  =  {𝒙 | 𝟏 ≤  𝒙 ≤  𝑵, 𝒈𝒄𝒅(𝑵, 𝒙)  =  𝟏} (1) 
Define Quadratic Residuosity Predicate as QN(y) = 0 if ∃𝑥 ∈ ℤ𝑵
∗  x
2
 = y mod N is true, and 
QN(y) = 1 if ∃𝑥 ∈ ℤ𝑵
∗  x
2
 = y mod N is not true. If QN(y) = 0 (i.e., y is a square y) y is said to be 
quadratic residue (QR), and if QN(y) = 1 (i.e., y is a non-square y) y is said to be quadratic non-
residue (QNR). 
If the equation 




) = 𝟏}  (2) 




 bit prime, then for every constant c and a family of computational bounded polynomial 
function 𝑓𝑘0(𝑦) there exists an integer 𝑘0 such that ∀𝐾 > 𝑘0  
Pry∈ ℤ𝐍










If equation 3 is true and 𝑘0 is large enough, then the probability of differentiating between QR 
and QNR is not better than guessing, i.e., the server will not be able to decipher the information 
requested by the user by trying to find out if y ∈ 𝑄𝑅 or y ∈ 𝑄𝑁𝑅. Readers interested in number 
theory or a good reference on quadratic residuosity predicate can read [41] and [42] respectively. 
We ran PIR protocol twice on user request to prevent the server from finding out user requested 
information and to minimize the amount of information released to the user. 
Processing SNNQ 
The following steps as shown on the high level architecture of Figure 3 will be followed 
in the processing of a private snapshot nearest neighbor query. 
Step 1: Server in the offline phase maps the grid as described on the neighborhood creation 
section of this chapter and stores the information in the database.  
 





Step 2: When a user initiates a query for the nearest POI, server sends the grid and the POIs 
information to the user which is actually neighborhood information. User finds the cell it belongs 
to and focus only on the neighborhood contained in that cell. User then generates her own 
location data 𝑙𝑢 based on its location. For each neighborhood in the user cell user computes with 
O(1) to O(k) the absolute difference in the distance |𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑙𝑢| to determine the closest 
neighborhood to the user location. Remember that the user will not know the exact location of 𝑝 
until server responds with the exact location. Initially, user only have the information of the 
neighborhood that contains the 𝑝.  
Step 3: When a user determines the object closest to its location, it sends a cryptic request to the 
server. For example, for s = ⌈√𝑛⌉ and a database D organized as an s x s matrix M let 𝐺2,3 be the 
grid that contains the user and let 𝑀𝑏,𝑐   be the matrix element of interest to the user, user 
randomly generates modulus N = q*q’ (equivalent to public key used in asymmetric 
cryptography) with a query message 𝑦 = [𝑦1, 𝑦2 ⋯ , 𝑦𝑠] and 𝑥 = [𝑥1, 𝑥2 ⋯ , 𝑥𝑠] such that 𝑦𝑐 ∈
𝑄𝑁𝑅 and ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑐 𝑦𝑗 ∈ 𝑄𝑅. Also 𝑥𝑏 ∈ 𝑄𝑁𝑅 and ∀𝑟 ≠ 𝑏 𝑥𝑟 ∈ 𝑄𝑅. User sends a query message 
PIR(c, b) to the server. Let the matrix column multiplication be represented as 
𝑧𝑟 = ∏ 𝑤𝑟,𝑗
𝑠
𝑗=1  (4) 
and the row as 
𝑍𝛼 =  ∏ 𝑧𝑟(𝑟,𝑗)
𝑠
𝑟=1  (5). 
where 𝑍𝛼 is a product of 𝑧𝑟 and 𝑥𝑟 within the range, 
𝑤𝑟,𝑗= 𝑦𝑗
2
 if 𝑀𝑟,𝑗   = 0, otherwise 𝑤𝑟,𝑗    = 𝑦𝑗 if 𝑀𝑟,𝑗  = 1 for all j = 1 → s. Also, 𝑧𝑟(𝑟,𝑗) =  𝑥𝑟
2 if 𝑀𝑟,𝑗= 




request. For every column and row server computes equations 4 and 5 respectively. It returns 𝑍𝛼 
to the user with O(1) ≪ O(s) in [5]. User will then as was previously in [43] determine 𝑍𝛼 value 
by computing equation 6. 
(𝑍∝
𝑞−1
2  = 1 mod q1) ^ (𝑍∝
𝑞′−1
2  = mod q1) (6) 
It will be easier to compute equation 6 since user knows q and q’. If equation 6 is true, 𝑍𝛼 ∈ 𝑄𝑅 
else 𝑍𝛼 ∈ 𝑄𝑁𝑅. Therefore, 𝑀𝑏,𝑐 computes to 0 if 𝑍𝛼 ∈ 𝑄𝑅, else 𝑀𝑏,𝑐 computes to 1 if 𝑍𝛼 ∈
𝑄𝑁𝑅. Remember that LBS server is unable to tell if the query encryption (𝑦, 𝑥) ∈ 𝑄𝑁𝑅 or QR 
due to the computational intractability of a large prime.  
Analysis and Results 
In this section, we present the analysis and results for the experimental evaluation of our 
design. We start by describing the experimental setup. In the experimental study we present the 
results of the implementation with respect to the execution time. We conduct experiments to 
study the scalability of the design for database performance. We also analyze the complexity of 
the design and compare with [5]. We first study CreateObjectNeighborhood which we use for 
mapping objects to a neighborhood.  
Note: Evaluation of the PIR cryptosystem is not part of this work since it has been proven to be 





The algorithm was developed in C and C + + languages. All experiments (client and 
server side) were conducted on a windows 7 PC running Intel quad-core i5-2410M processor at 
2.3GHz with 4GB RAM. We used as an input to our mapping algorithm the raw data provided 
by United States Board on Geographic Names (USBGN) [44]. All coordinates are given in the 
WGS 84 coordinate reference system. WGS 84 is the latest revision of the World Geodetic 
System which is used in mapping and navigation including GPS satellite navigation system. We 
use the map of Boston, Massachusetts an area of United States with geographic coordinate of 42° 
21’ 29”N and 71° 03’ 49”W having approximately 48 square miles of land and 41 square miles 
of water.  
For segmentation, we use the neighborhoods of Boston from list of the neighborhoods in 
Boston [45]. Two datasets were needed in the experiments: points of interests for which we use a 
set of spatial datasets provided by the City of Boston in [46], and user locations which were 
randomly generated since user location varies within the coverage area. Figure 4 shows part of 
the algorithm that updates object location as it is identified. Different sizes of grid n and objects k 
were used in our experiment to validate database scalability and performance. Different 
combinations of k and n were used to evaluate the design. We use Haversine Formula in [47] to 
calculate in decimal degree the distance between two points. Haversine Formula does not 
consider the non-spheroidal (ellipsoidal) shape of the Earth; therefore, we disregard the problem 




Initially, object location information is obtained and maintained in a binary search tree 
(BST), where object location information in node y (node on left sub tree of x) means that 
x.key>y.key and vice versa for node y (node on right sub tree of x). BST is used by the 
UpdateDatabaseMatrix routine. After initial creation, update of new location information is 
handled through insertion sort to the appropriate node to preserve the sorted order of the tree. 
 
Figure 4 Algorithm updating objects locations 
Execution Time 
We conduct series of experiments to determine execution time to create neighborhoods 
for the objects so that each neighborhood contains no more than one object. Neighborhoods are 
created in the algorithm shown in Figure 5, and the execution time results are shown in Figure 6. 
In the first experiment we measure and analyze the execution time to create neighborhoods for 





Figure 5 Algorithm creating neighborhoods 
It is important to note that execution time will vary slightly based on operating systems 
allocation of threads to the processor; therefore, for measuring execution time we averaged the 
time taken over 100 runs. Figure 6 shows the execution time to create neighborhoods over an 
area mapped into a grid of size 16. As shown in the figure, object size has minimal impact on the 
computation time. As the number of objects in a cell increases by 4 (from 4 to 32), execution 
time fluctuates between 139ms and 237ms. The execution time seems to be independent of k. We 
averaged execution time over the range of different k values which resulted in 166ms for each k 
for k from 4 − 32 for a given n. We observe steady increase in execution time as we increase the 
size of the grid; however, as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 (n = 16 and n = 64 respectively) the 
proportionality of the increase is less than 1. It is interesting to note that since the increase is less 
than 1 for n in the range of 16 to 64, the system will scale well for different populations. The 




be far from the average time. Figure 8 shows the execution time in milliseconds for different 
sizes of grid n and relatively small k values. It shows that time is also unaffected by k. This is 
very important in a densely populated area. Since k has little effect on the execution time, we can 
appreciate the impact in an area with large concentration of k since we can reduce the size of n to 
the smallest possible value and increase the size of k in a cell and still achieve desirable result. 
 
Figure 6 Computation time (ms) to create neighborhoods as k changes over an area with n=16 
There are three observations to be deduced from Figure 9. First, when n is small, an increase 
between (1.5 and 2.5)n has little impact on execution time. Second, if n is large, same increase 
has more significant change in execution time. Third, for the same n the time difference is more 
noticeable for large n than small n as k increases. Similarly, Figure 10 shows the time for large k. 
These observations play a significant role in mapping an area in order to achieve better 




concentration of k, increasing the size of k in a cell and reducing the size of n will produce less 
execution time. Increase in n within the threshold will result in negligible increase in execution 
time. In the second and third observations, increasing n for a large value of n will have 
significant increase in execution time as k increases; however, if the area is large enough to 
create multiple segments of small n where the aggregate will result in significant increase in 
computation time, then single segment with large n which will result in smaller k will be more 
desirable. In the alternative, we can create multiple databases for each segment while still 
keeping k small for a more improved performance.  
 
Figure 7 Computation time (ms) to create neighborhoods as k changes over an area with n=64 
We also study the performance trend on the execution time for finding nearest POI in the 
FindNearestNeighbor module. The results are presented in Figure 11 and Figure 12 for the 
different values of n when k is set to 36 and with user location changing within the grid. Figure 




things impact execution time: First, the grid size, and second, the cell number user belongs to, 
i.e., the time for a user to determine its location on the grid. In Figure 12, we vary k from 4 to 40. 
Again, the object size is less significant on the execution time. This also is very important 
because it provides opportunity for scaling the database in the case of a densely populated area. 
 
Figure 8 Computation time (ms) for various k =20, 24 and 32 as n gets large 
Figure 13 shows the result for a case where user cell c remains the same as n and k varies. We 
observe a small change in computation time as the range of n changes from 16 upwards to 1225, 
and the ranges for k changes from 4 upwards to 40. Similarly, Figure 14 shows the result for a 
very large increase in k (up to 300 in a cell) while the user location changes within the grid and 
the size of the grid remains constant at16. In Figure 13 and Figure 14, we can see the impact of 
the size of n for users in the same cell. When n is small, execution time is reduced compare to 
large n. As the figures also show, significant time is spent by the user to determine the cell it 




n should be balanced with k to avoid small n that will result in large k, or for a very small k that 
will result in large n.  
 
Figure 9 Large changes in n shows more significant change in time (ms) than small change in n 
 
 





The results in Figure 15 and Figure 16 is for n = 16 and n = 64 respectively with Figure 
15 having a lower c number. As shown in in the figures, k has impact in execution time. 
Therefore, for a large area where k is sparsely located, creating a big size grid which will result 
in a few numbers of n and similarly small numbers of k will be more desirable. The lesson here 
is to make n reasonably small which will result in a relatively small number of cells thereby 
reducing the time for a user to find the cell it belongs to. 
 






Figure 12 Computation time (ms) impacted only by n and user cell c for varying k (4,8…40) 
 
Scalability 
We describe scalability in terms of the ability to scale our design based on the size of the 
object and the area to achieve desirable performance. This is important in the case of urban area 
where objects concentrate in a fairly small quarters, or large area where objects are sparsely 
located. It allows us to scale the area to a few grids with a large concentration of objects in a 
grid, or create more grids with few objects contained in a grid. The database can then be scaled 
accordingly for performance. As shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10, during neighborhoods 
creation computation time remains fairly the same (with few outliers) as k increases. Similar 
observations were made as shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16 when finding nearest neighbor 





Figure 13 Computing time (ms) when n = (16,36,…1225), and k = (4,8,…40), and constant c. 
 
 




Complexity and Comparison 
We analyze computation and communication complexity and compare with [5]. The 
results are shown in Table 1. In the comparison, we consider user side communication for 
sending PIR and the computation for decrypting server response. We also consider computation 
and the transmission cost on the server. As already established, the database is organized as a 
√𝑛 𝑥 √𝑛 matrix where each matrix element is m-bit long.  
 
Figure 15 Computation time (seconds) for n=16, constant low c value, and varying k 
The encryption modulus is p bits, and f(p) is the polynomial function used to denote the 
computation cost on the value of the p bits. We use double PIR which results in server 
computation cost of O(f(p)m√𝑛) ∗ 2, which represents the cost for computing 𝑍 =  ∏ 𝑧𝑟(𝑟,𝑗)
𝑠
𝑟=1 . 
This is more than the cost in [5]. However, the reduced cost in [5] comes at the expense of 




decrypt the server response is reduced to O(f(p)m) since the double PIR allows the server to 
transmit only the desired POI. The same operation takes O(f(p)m√𝑛) in [5] because it sends the 
entire matrix column to the user which requires user to compute through the entire column in 
order to retrieve a single nearest neighbor. The downside in our design can be seen for very 
small √𝑛 where [5] will perform better. However, that will require √𝑛 to be 1 (single-
dimensional matrix) which is less likely for the database representation.  
Table 1 Computation and Communication Cost Comparison 
Cost Type Our Scheme Ghinita et.al. 
Computation (server) 𝑂(𝑓(𝑝)𝑚√𝑛)2 𝑂(𝑓(𝑝)𝑚√𝑛) 
Computation (user) 𝑂(𝑓(𝑝)𝑚) 𝑂(𝑓(𝑝)𝑚√𝑛) 
Communication (server) 𝑂(𝑝𝑚) 𝑂(𝑝𝑚√𝑛) 
Communication (user) 𝑂(𝑝𝑚) ∗ 2 𝑂(𝑝𝑚) 
 
Server communication cost in our protocol is O(pm), while [5] is O(pm√𝑛). The improvement 
comes from implementing double PIR in the server which results in the server sending only the 
requested POI against the entire column of POI sent in [5]. For the communication complexity, 
in our design user has to send two PIR moduli p each for column and row encryption. The cost 





Figure 16 Computation time (seconds) for n=64, constant high c value, and varying k 
In general, our design specifically creates neighborhood that satisfies Hausdorff axiom of 
topological space for each of the POI. Location data is assigned to the neighborhood which is 
then assigned to the POI contained in the neighborhood. This will prevent the user from 
deciphering the exact location of the POI from the information sent with the grid. The position of 
the location data of the neighborhood in the database is aligned such that when a user determines 
the closest neighborhood, it can match the position with the location of information in the 
database. The double PIR ensures that only the requested information is released to the user. By 
adopting the concept of Hausdorff space in our design we were able to divide an area into 
neighborhoods that contain a single POI. The design allows us to scale the database to the size of 
the neighborhood in the area so that a user can relate its location to information in the database 
thereby allowing the server to run PIR protocol on the information in the database and returns to 
the user only the desired information. Compare to design of [5], server sends the entire grid to 




shortest distance to its location. This technique exposes too many of the database information to 
the user, involves increase in the transmission cost, and increases the computation cost on the 
user.  
Double PIR protocol used in our design is to minimize the amount of data revealed by the 
server as seen in [5] and to reduce the communication cost for transferring the data back to the 
user. User will only have information on the nearest object and no other object. Nonetheless, PIR 
has some obvious challenges, it has been criticized for been too costly to implement. For 
instance, large modulus is preferred for enhanced security, but as the size of the modulus 
increases so is the cost both in time and complexity.  The increase in the object and size of the 
grid also leads to increase in the size of the database which increases the cost of the 
implementation. In later chapters, we will explore parallel computing and hardware approach to 




CHAPTER FOUR: PARALLEL COMPUTING IN SNNQ  
We first design CPU serial implementation of the snapshot nearest neighbor query. Due 
to the limited resources and computational limitation of the CPU the response time increases as 
the size of the grid and the object increases. The increase in response time will affect quality of 
service in LBS. We address this issue by utilizing GPU and CUDA API to break the algorithm 
into smaller parts which are computed simultaneously in order to reduce the total computation 
time. GPU has been gaining lots of traction in the research community mainly due to its inherent 
parallel design. GPU is a device present in most modern PCs. They are designed for high speed 
graphics which are inherently parallel. It is made up of array of streaming multiprocessors which 
currently have cores up to 48 for Fermi, and 192 for Kepler architectures [48]. This allows 
scaling of the processor. Figure 17 is a sample GPU architecture depicting the host and device 
memory where CPU and GPU codes respectively execute.  
 




The P1, P2 ⋯ , P𝑛 in the figure represent single instruction scalar processor (SP) inside the SMs. 
Each SM is equipped with its own L1 cache, and the L1 caches are connected to an L2 cache. 
The challenging part of GPU computing is to determine where and what to parallelize. 
Gieseke et al in [49] propose using GPU to implement nearest neighbor search on a refined 
classical k-d tree called buffer k-d tree. Proposed in [50] is a CUDA based parallel 
implementation of nearest neighbor search using GPU which achieved a speedup over serial 
implementation of the same algorithm. Silvestri et al in [51] exploited GPU in a continuous 
range queries and location update to achieve a 20x speedup over serial computation of the same 
dataset. They utilized CPU/GPU in all the computation phase to preprocess the data set such that 
objects in the same index grid cell are stored consecutively to optimize memory access. They 
also produce and transfer in parallel the list of object ids for each issued query. Though effective, 
the method that was used to apply parallelism to the cells may lead to load imbalance. Our 
design of single object neighborhoods helps to create data independent which is crucial for 
parallelization. The CPU computes the serial part of the algorithm. Using CUDA API, CPU code 
spurns thread the size of the total independent computation needed to perform the operations on 
the GPU. The threads run concurrently. At the completion of the operation, the data is transferred 
back to the CPU. 
Not every application is suitable for parallel computing. Applications that qualify for 
parallel processing should have scalability, speedup, and efficiency. The amount of speedup that 
can be achieved in application is directly related to percentage of the program that can be 




parallelized will limit the overall speedup available from parallelization. If β represents the 











represents the maximum speed-up that can be achieved by parallelizing the program. If P is the 
proportion of a program that can be parallelized, (1 − P) = β represent the fraction of running 
time spent on non-parallelizable parts. Maximum speedup that can be achieved by using N 
processors can also be represented as  
𝑆(𝑁) =  lim
𝑁→∞
1







This is how much faster the computation runs on parallel hardware. 
Graphical Processing Unit 
According to [53], CPU will idle if there are not enough processes to keep it busy. If 
there are too many small tasks with each blocking after a short period, the CPU will spend most 
of its time context switching and very little time doing useful work. With CPU, scheduling 
policies are often time multiplexing (dividing the time equally among the threads). The 
percentage of time spent context switching is directly proportional to the number of threads; 
therefore, large increase in number of threads decreases efficiency. In contrast, GPU requires 
thousands of threads to work efficiently. GPU is designed to handle stall conditions which are 




something useful to work on. When a GPU hits a memory fetch operation or has to wait on the 
result of a calculation, the streaming processors will switch to another instruction stream and 
return to the stalled instruction stream sometime later.  
For the most part, CPU run single thread programs and are mostly dual or quad core 
devices. It calculates a single data point per core per iteration. GPU; however, runs in parallel by 
default. Instead of calculating just a single data point per SM, GPU calculates 32 data points per 
SM. This provides a 4x advantage in terms of number of cores over a typical quad core CPU, and 
also a 32x advantage in terms of data throughput. GPU provides high speed memory (shared 
memory) next to the SM which allows the programmer to safely leave data in this memory 
knowing that the data will not be destroyed by the hardware. It also serves as the primary 
communication mechanism among threads. Cook in [53] stated that there are two major 
differences in the task execution model of a GPU. The first is that groups of N SPs execute in a 
lock-step basis running the same program but on different data. The second is that because of the 
GPU huge register file switching threads have effectively zero overhead. GPU can support a very 
large number of threads and is designed in this way. Over the years, GPU has steadily 
outperformed CPU [54]. 
Compute Unified Device Architecture 
CUDA is an extension of the C language that allows GPU code to be written in regular C. 
The code is written for the host processor (CPU) or the device processor (GPU). The host 
processor spawns kernels or multithreads tasks onto the GPU device. The GPU through its 




is ideal for problems that are extensively parallel, and that it can be used if a problem can be 
constructed and the output data points represented without relation to each other. This is ideal for 
our protocol where the output data are independent. CUDA splits problems into grids of blocks, 
each of the blocks contain multiple threads. The blocks can run in any order, however, only a 
limited number of blocks will execute at any point in time determined by the resource 
requirement of a thread block. Blocks execute end to end in any one of the SMs. It is normally 
done in a round-robin basis to allow equity distribution of blocks among the SMs. In its basic 
form, a grid made up of threads is split into blocks, and the blocks are split into warps. To 
perform action, the kernel provides some action and data, each thread then works on its 
individual part of the problem. Threads can swap data with one another under the coordination of 
either the warp or the block, but any thread coordination with the blocks can only be performed 
by the kernel.  
CUDA program runs on the CPU and transfers needed data to the GPU, the GPU 
performs execution and returns the data to the CPU. The process continues until the application 
terminates. Based on this process, the total execution time 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  can be broken into parts as 
follows: 
𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =  𝛽 +  𝑡𝐻𝐷 +  𝛼 + 𝑡𝐷𝐻 (7) 
 The β in equation 7 represents the serial portion of program executed by the CPU. The parallel 
part executed by the GPU is represented by α, while 𝑡𝐻𝐷is the time required to transfer the data 
from the host to the device, and 𝑡𝐷𝐻 represents the time needed to transfer the data from the 




β, however, significant reduction in β accounts for the improvement. Note that equation 7 is 
correct if there are no overlaps between data transfer and kernel execution. 
Task Model 
Ideal algorithm for a GPU should be able to have enough parallelization that will 
significantly account for 𝑡𝐻𝐷  and 𝑡𝐷𝐻. The algorithm in Figure 18 for the CPU-based code loops 
through the gridSize and the objectSize and creates and assigns objects to neighborhoods within a 
cell c contained in the grid G. The struct of each object has array called objectNeighborhood[ ] 
which maintains a list of all objects of a given neighborhood. The loop through the 
cellNumber.size() and objectSize identifies each neighborhood with their object and their cell 
number. For the GPU-based implementation, computecellArea and CreateCells are still present 
and execute on the CPU, the loops are performed by the GPU by first allocating memory and 
copying over the data using cudaMalloc and cudaMemcpy respectively. 
Implementation 
We create a sorted linear binary search tree (BST) that holds object locations. The 
crtObjNHood module creates the neighborhoods by computing the difference between the 












For object i the location value 𝑙𝑝(𝑖) is lN𝐻𝐷(𝑗). The piece of code in Figure 18 runs on the CPU. 
Line number 11 launches CUDA kernel function that executes on GPU. The CUDA kernel in the 
algorithm of Figure 19 stores the value of the neighborhood which is assigned to the object for a 
given index in the variable lN𝐻𝐷[𝑗] for that same index. The “for” loop iterates “tid” times 
(index 1 to tid). This is translated to “size” threads in CUDA. Each thread executes the line 
𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷[𝑗] =  𝑙𝑝[𝑖] +  
|𝑜𝑏𝑗(𝑙𝑝[𝑖] −  𝑙𝑝[𝑖 + 1])|
2
 
This is made possible by the design of the algorithm which creates no dependency between the 
iterations. The _global prefix tells the compiler to generate a GPU code rather than CPU during 
compilation. The GPU function is called with 
“crtObjnHood<<<blocksPerGrid,threadsPerBlock>>>(𝑙𝑁𝐻𝐷,lp, SIZE)”. The “blocksPerGrid” 
parameter tells the GPU the number of blocks to be allocated for the thread execution, and 
“threadsPerBlock” tells the GPU how many threads in a block. Line 11 of algorithm of Figure 
18 calls the GPU “crtObjNHood” module “SIZE” times and each call is made with a different 
thread. Each thread does four reads from memory, one subtraction, two additions, and one store 






Figure 18 Code that runs on the CPU and launches kernel function 
Analysis and Results 
We provide analysis for the GPU parallel implementation of the SNNQ and compare the 
results with the CPU implementation. We did not start to define the core of our performance 
model in order to predict the GPU execution time. Our goal is to conduct statistical analysis 
based on performing variety of simulations and compare it with CPU execution time, and then 
define the performance model based on actual experiment. The testing computer is Aliewnware 
X51 R2 running windows 7 operating system and equipped with Intel core i7-4770 processor 
with 12G RAM. Available in the system is NVIDIA GeForce GTX 760 Ti with 2G GDDR5. 
Table 2 shows the rest of the GPU specification. The threads are grouped into 32 thread groups 
called warp. Each warp is placed into the SM to be executed by the number of the SPs available 




use of the hardware which could lead to drop in performance [53]. The values of the data sets 
used in our simulation were chosen to maximize performance. For the most part, the number of 
threads per block was based on achieving 100% utilization factor of a compute capability 3.0 
GPU as prescribed in [53], and to maximize the number of threads to reduce the effect of 
memory latency.  
 
Figure 19 Piece of code that runs on GPU to create neighborhoods 
We create blocks with thread counts that are a round multiple of the warp size in order to 
have enough active warps in each streaming multiprocessor to sufficiently hide all of the 
different memory and instruction pipeline latency of the architecture in order to achieve 
maximum throughput. For instance, we create 512 threads (32 threads per warp) which results in 
16 warps so that we can schedule up to 64 warps (32 x 64) for a total of 2,048 threads at a time in 
a single SM. For the most part, we chose our thread size to ensure that we have the maximum 




of blocks with the hope of reducing the time for GPU to add and remove each block from the 
SM. As previously stated, the grid size in our protocol has to be a square. This presents some 
challenges when processing data which are not multiple of the kernel launch parameter. We use 
padding to fill those that are less than warp size. For instance, 8,100 threads were needed to be 
processed in one instance; however, this does not equate to a perfect multiple of a warp, we 
therefore padded it with 92 extra threads to make it perfect multiple of a warp. Our goal is also to 
make use of all the available SMs in every execution. For example, we have 5,376 threads to 
compute, we split it into 384 threads per block and then we have a total of 14 blocks to be 
allocated to the SMs. This will require each SM to have two complete blocks and no left over 
block. Since all the SMs are running the same kernel, it is likely their execution time will be the 
same. All the SMs will be available at the same time. Assumption here is that the allocation is 
done on a round-robin basis since NVIDIA does not disclose the methods of scheduling used. 
Also, in some cases we create large number of blocks to reduce the size of threads in a block 
when the blocks are not multiple of SMs in order to avoid the time delay for the leftover block to 









Table 2 GPU System Specification 
Unit Specification 




Maximum Thread per 
Block 
1024 
Maximum Thread per SM 2048 
Graphic Clocks (MHz) 915 
Processor Clock (MHz) 980 
Memory Clock 6.0Gbps 
Memory Interface GDDR5 
Standard Memory Config 2G 





Compute Capability 3.0 
 
Comparing CPU and GPU Performance 
We show here the results of the simulation we ran as the size of the database increases 
and compare the differences in performance between GPU and CPU with respect to run time. We 
studied the impact of parameter tuning for making CUDA calls to examine the effect on GPU 
execution time, and we provide analysis for deciding the right thread and block size. We then 
provide a model for predicting GPU execution time. Figure 20 and Figure 21 depicts 
computation time between CPU and GPU. It shows the result for the serial computation 
performed in two different computers with different specifications. The first computer was only 
used for CPU serial execution since it does not have CUDA-enabled GPU. We performed both 




GPU significantly reduces the response time as the size of the database increases. GPU shows on 
the average an improvement factor of 23.9 over CPU using the same hardware.  
Results of our experiment show that creating a small size threads per block for a 
maximum occupancy of the SM performed better when the size of the objects were small. The 
same observation was made for small size threads per block with 94% SM occupancy. However, 
the results also show that when the size of the objects are large, better performance will be 
achieved by creating large size threads per block that result in a 100% utilization factor. This is 
likely due to global memory latencies from GPU adding and removing each block from the SM. 
In other words, small thread size in a block performs better when the size of the objects are 
small, while large thread size in a block performs better when the size of the objects are large.  
Some challenges were observed in our GPU implementation. Dealing with large data sets 
is one of them. As the size of the grid increases, so does the size of the database matrix and the 
modulus used for the encryption. These data which are stored in the system RAM are transferred 
to the GPU. The data easily exceeds the size of the system RAM causing data to be retrieved 
from the disk before sending to the GPU thereby causing transfer delays. Another challenge is 
the database structure which requires square matrix that may not always map to a perfect 
multiple of warp thereby requiring extra padding in the kernel launch parameter in order to 





Figure 20 Time difference between GPU/CPU for thread size of 1024 
 
 





Modelling GPU Run-Time 
Some work has been performed on GPU run time modelling. The work provided in [54] 
modelled execution time in multiple GPUs for algorithms whose GPU work scales linearly as the 
number of mobile objects increases. Other GPU modeling like the one in [55] modelled existing 
algorithm not similar to our work. Our goal is to create a model specifically for our algorithm 
and similar algorithms in order to provide a guide for determining the size of the parameters to 
achieve optimal result without knowledge of the intricacies of the GPU architecture. 
We set to predict the execution time based on the size of the parameter use in the CUDA 
calls. We start by developing run time equation for an object using the run time for a block and 
for each additional block. We extrapolate the run time for a problem set based on the equation 
and then determine query execution time for a single object. This would be the time to create one 
neighborhood. To find query execution time for a single object, we first find out block execution 
time 𝑇𝐵𝐸𝑥𝑒. This is done by running several operations. We determine the block processing time 
𝐾𝑡 for adding and removing blocks to the SMs by running operations first with a single block 
and then by adding blocks to the SMs. The execution time 𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑒 for a single object is then 
represented as follows: 




𝑇𝐵𝐸𝑥𝑒 is the execution time for a single block of the given problem, and 𝑇ℎ𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  is the size of 
thread in a block. From equation 9, we can extrapolate the GPU execution time 𝑇𝐺𝑃𝑈  for a given 
problem. Let the number of blocks be 𝐵𝑁𝑢𝑚, let 𝑃𝑠  be the problem set, where 𝑃𝑠 = 𝑇ℎ𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 




𝑇𝐺𝑃𝑈(𝑃𝑠) =  𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑒 ∗  𝑇ℎ𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗  ⌊
𝐵𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝑁𝑆𝑀
⌋ +  𝐾𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑁𝑢𝑚 + 𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑒 ∗  𝑇ℎ𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (10) 
Equation 10 represents the total time a given problem will take to execute on the GPU with 𝑁𝑆𝑀   
SMs. Note that 𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑒  will be the same for each object since the same thread is being executed. 
Also, the last part of equation 10 (𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑒 ∗  𝑇ℎ𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is the time to execute the last block in the 
problem set. From equation 10 we can see the importance of creating blocks that are multiple of 
the SMs, because the whole operation waits for the last block to complete. We can also see that 
the optimal 𝑇ℎ𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  and 𝐵𝑁𝑢𝑚 depends on 𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑒   (which depends on the complexity of the 
operation) and 𝐾𝑡. As shown in Table 3, this model has shown to be quite accurate for different 
object sizes. The large number of objects used in our model allows us to provide a precise 
average run time for the objects thereby giving a highly accurate approximation of the expected 
run time. It is important to note that this model will accurately predict GPU run time for 
applications which GPU execution scales similarly to ours. 
 
Table 3 Run time (ms) for different thread sizes in a block 
Total Object 1024/Blk 768/Blk 512/Blk 384/Blk 256/Blk 
100,000 64.302 64.473 64.350 64.310 64.311 
200,000 69.772 69.710 69.663 69.662 69.798 
300,000 78.445 78.522 78.455 78.522 78.455 
400,000 80.972 80.920 80.872 81.006 80.915 
1,000,000 98.202 98.227 98.152 98.189 98.177 
2,000,000 128.003 127.987 127.971 127.962 127.954 





CHAPTER FIVE: HARDWARE ASSIST PRIVATE INFORMATION 
PROTECTION IN LBS-SNNQ 
Alternatively, tamper-resistant hardware can be used to protect private information in 
LBS-SNNQ. Tamper-resistant hardware computing technology with secure coprocessor allows 
usage of onboard chip or microprocessor to carry out cryptographic operation thereby 
eliminating the need for protecting rest of the sub-system. In general, secure coprocessor refers 
to a physically secure subsystem of a larger host computer. The idea is for the coprocessor to 
provide a secure means of computation and data storage against an adversary even when they 
have access to the host system. Smartcards and Trusted Platform Module (TPM) are some of the 
ways that secure coprocessor can be deployed. In the design proposed in [56], [57], and [58] only 
the coprocessor is considered secure while the rest of the system including operating system 
(OS) is considered vulnerable to software attack. Other application of secure coprocessor 
technology is in cloud computing where network of remote servers hosted over the internet are 
used to store and process data. In this work, we propose to use secure coprocessor to protect user 
private information in LBS-SNNQ. This will help to minimize the amount of information 
transferred while still allowing a user to obtain the nearest POI to its location without adversary 
having the ability to decipher user location or the information obtained. This is achieved through 
encryption of transmitted information, obfuscated instruction execution using hardware 
architecture proven to be secure, and engaging in obscure access to a remote storage device. A 
user sends encrypted query to a secure coprocessor. The secure coprocessor processes user 
information and engages in a periodic and coordinated access to a remote server to obtain user 




coprocessor is different from using a trusted third party. In the remainder of this chapter, we 
explain the secure coprocessor and the tools used to implement our design. We provide 
experimental analysis and compare with the software approach. 
Secure Coprocessor  
A secure coprocessor contains CPU, bootstrap ROM, and secure non-volatile memory 
which cannot be physicality penetrated [59]. It is designed to meet rigorous security 
requirements that assure unobservable and unmolested running of the code residing in it even in 
the physical presence of an adversary [7]. The Input-Output (I/O) interface to the module is the 
only way to gain access to the internal state [59]. The device is equipped with hardware 
cryptographic accelerators that enable efficient and fast implementation of cryptographic 
algorithms such as DES and RSA [35]. Secure coprocessor [7] provides protection for code to 
execute and carry high-speed encryption process. Crucial for its operations are: resource 
management, communication, key management, and encryption services. A secure coprocessor 
is designed such that upon a break-in the intruder cannot learn or change the internal state except 
through normal I/O channels or by forcibly resetting the entire secure coprocessor [59]. 
Nonetheless, the security of a coprocessor can be breached through physical or software 
attack. In a physical attack the adversary have access to the hardware [33] and can dictate 
problem behavior by tampering with the hardware pins through the means in [60]. Software 
attack involves malicious use of software to remotely launch attack without physical access to 
the hardware such as the cache attack addressed in [61], [62], and [63]. In this work, we consider 




requirement for oblivious computation which includes: (1) same amount of work and time will 
be spent for each operation (i.e., all operations including saving information in the internal 
memory and discarding information cannot be differentiated). (2) Each user thread owns the 
coprocessor the entire time, therefore, no other thread will be able to access information been 
computed for another user. (3) Coprocessor actions and operations for external request must be 
obfuscated. The coprocessor accesses the server through ORAM methodology.  
Oblivious Random Access Memory 
ORAM is defined in [64] as a probabilistic random access memory (RAM) which has 
memory access distribution pattern independent of the input. It allows a client to obscure its 
access pattern to a remote storage server through continuous reshuffle and re-encrypt of the 
information stored in the remote server. It prevents any leakage of information that could assist 
adversary to determine the type of memory access (read or write), location accessed, or what 
data is read or written by the client. Different flavors of ORAM have been proposed, like the 
ones in [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], [36] and used in [71] to build a secure coprocessor 
architecture called Ascend which guarantees privacy for data stored in a cloud computing 
environment. ORAM model defined in [66] consists of a basic RAM decoupled into two 
interactive machines (CPU and memory module) which acted as Interactive Turing-Machine 
(ITM). The read-only communication tape of the CPU is associated with the write-only 
communication tape of the memory, and vice versa. The ORAM algorithm is such that an 
adversary can observe the physical storage locations accessed, but, it ensures that the adversary 




ORAM discussed in this chapter is known as Path ORAM. It is designed for optimization by 
focusing on a path rather than the entire database information.  
Path-ORAM  
To obfuscate the exact information accessed, most ORAM techniques are based on 
streaming the entire database. For our work, we implement Path ORAM of [36] to reduce the 
computational burden of streaming the entire database each time query is issued thereby 
reducing the access time. The design is based on security principles defined in [68]. It requires 
that no information be leaked about which data is being accessed, the last time data was 
accessed, if the same data has been accessed, access pattern (random, sequential, round-robin 
etc.), or whether the access is read or write. It is implemented with a binary tree data structure of 
height H and 2𝐻 leaves. Data is stored in the tree node called bucket. Each bucket contains up to 
Z blocks, and the buckets are padded if necessary to always maintain block of size Z. 
The sequence of data request as described in [68] is as follows: 
?⃗? ∶= ((𝑜𝑝𝑀, 𝛼𝑀, 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑀), ⋯ , (𝑜𝑝1, 𝛼1, 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎1)) (11) 
M is the length of data request sequence, and each 𝑜𝑝𝑖 represents operations 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑(𝛼𝑖) or 
a 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒(𝛼𝑖, 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎). In other words, 𝛼𝑖 is the identifier of the block been read or written, while 
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑖 is the data been written. The first index represents the most recent load or store data, and 
the last index M represents the oldest load or store operation. Given a sequence of data request ?⃗? 
such that 𝐴(?⃗?) is the random sequence of access to the remote storage place, secure ORAM is 
defined such that any two data request sequences ?⃗? and ?⃗? with access pattern 𝐴(?⃗?) and 𝐴(?⃗?) 




if given an input ?⃗? ORAM returns with a probability ≥ 1 − 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑙(|?⃗?|) data which is consistent 
with ?⃗?. The data path is defined such that 𝑖 ∈ {0,1, ⋯ , 2𝐻 − 1} represents i-th leaf node, where H 
is the height of the binary tree, and 𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝛼] represents the block 𝛼 currently associated 
with leaf node i. Leaf node i defines a unique path from leaf i to the root, and 𝜌(𝑖) denote sets of 
buckets along the path from i to the root. Also 𝜌(𝑖, ℎ) represents the bucket in 𝜌(𝑖) at height h in 
the tree. 
 The path ORAM client maintains two data structures: stash S, and location map. The 
stash is used locally by the client to store a small number of overflow data blocks from the 
server. The client also stores location map where 𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝛼] corresponds to block 𝛼 
currently mapped to i-th leaf node, i.e., block 𝛼 resides in some bucket in the path 𝜌(𝑖) or in the 
client stash. During initialization (client stash is empty) server encrypts some dummy blocks and 
randomly assigns it to the buckets. The location map for the client contains random numbers 
between 0 and 2𝐻 − 1. The read and write processes are as follows: 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 ← 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑, 𝛼, 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒) from block 𝛼, and 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒, 𝛼, 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) to block 𝛼. The 
position of block 𝛼 is remapped to a new random position. For a read operation if i is the old 
position for the block, then, read path 𝜌(𝑖) that contains block 𝛼. For a write operation update the 
data for block 𝛼, write back the path and any additional block from the stash. Block 𝛼′is placed 
in a bucket at h if 𝜌(𝑖, ℎ) ∩ 𝜌(𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝛼′], ℎ). 
Note that all the Z blocks are read from the bucket during a read operation and decrypted. For a 
write operation the encrypted blocks are written back into the bucket and padded if necessary to 
create size Z block. Path ORAM security as stated in [36] is such that if ?⃗? is the sequence used 




𝑃 = 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀[𝛼𝑀], 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀−1[𝛼𝑀−1], ⋯ , 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1[𝛼1]) (12) 
and 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗[𝛼𝑗] represents the address location 𝛼𝑗for the position map of the j-th load or store 
operation including paths 𝜌 (𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗(𝛼𝑗)) ∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑀 encrypted using random encryption. 
Each 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖(𝛼𝑖) is randomly remapped after it is revealed to the server; therefore, 
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖(𝛼𝑖) is statistically independent of 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗(𝛼𝑗) for 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝛼𝑗) = (𝛼𝑖). Also, 
since address locations are independent of one another; hence, for 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝛼𝑗) ≠ (𝛼𝑖) 
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖(𝛼𝑖) is independent of 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗(𝛼𝑗). Therefore,  
Pr(𝑃) = ∏ Pr (𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗(𝛼𝑗)
𝑀




If equation 13 is true, then, 𝐴(?⃗?) cannot be computationally distinguished from a random 
access 𝐴(?⃗?). 
System Architecture 
Our model is based on a secure coprocessor accessing external memory under the control 
of LBS server using path ORAM. Figure 22 depicts system high level interaction between user, 
secure coprocessor, and the LBS server. The problem solved in this model is the same as 
previously stated in software cryptography, i.e., protecting user private information from been 
disclosed to another party in LBS snapshot nearest neighbor query. Our technique is based on 
coprocessor technology that supports computation of arbitrary programs. The coprocessor serves 
as a client to the LBS server through path ORAM methodology access. The coprocessor can be 





Figure 22 High level architecture of the interaction between user, secure coprocessor, and the 
server. 
The coprocessor maintains a stash as in [36]. Each record is stored as a unit pair 
(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖(𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖, 𝑝𝑖)) in unsecured storage device outside the coprocessor, where 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖 is the location 
information of the object 𝑝𝑖. The coprocessor interacts with the server to obtain information 
stored in the server using ORAM methodology. Object location information stored in the server 
is represented with a binary search tree (BST) data structure. All information must have the same 
number of bytes B. The BST is such that all buckets are of equal size blocks. Buckets are padded 
with dummy blocks if necessary. We use location data for the BST keys. Location data on the 
nodes on the left sub-tree are smaller than the key, while location data on the nodes to the right 
are larger than the key. Location information is stored by the LBS server. Random locations are 
picked in a balanced manner by the coprocessor. The location data of these random locations are 
used as key to the tree and stored in the coprocessor stash. For example, suppose three location 
data randomly picked and used for the keys are 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 (28.2N, 72.5W), 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 (28.5N, 72.8W), and 




while all 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 < 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖 < 𝑘𝑒𝑦3 is to the right of 𝑘𝑒𝑦2. The coprocessor will use this structure to 
determine the access path for the user required information. 
Assumptions 
The assumptions include the following: 
1. The secure coprocessor features a software architecture that allows developers to 
install and update their applications onto the device in a way that protects the privacy 
and security interests of the developer. 
2. Attacker has no physical access to the hardware or that a direct physical access will 
not interfere with the computation. 
3. The coprocessor is a tamper proof black box designed to satisfy requirements for 
oblivious computation as in [66] and stated in [71]. 
Algorithm Design 
Secure coprocessor like IBM 4758 model runs its code on the application layer of the 
card. In our work, we follow similar design of [7] and build a framework that emulates a secure 
coprocessor card that runs the code to perform the task. The algorithm is designed to ensure 
oblivious conditions are met in the secure coprocessor operations. The first condition is satisfied 
by allocating to each thread equal amount of time for operations. Same amount of time will be 
spent writing to the memory information considered to be a hit and discarding information 




coprocessor (where 𝑋 = 𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ 𝑥𝑛), for 𝑥𝑖 ≠ 𝑥𝑗 if 𝑥𝑖 is the desired information the same 
amount of time will be spent to write 𝑥𝑖 to the internal memory and to discard 𝑥𝑗. The 
implementation is such that the time and effort spent for all operations will be indistinguishable. 
This will prevent adversary from distinguishing the type of operation performed. The 
coprocessor maintains two tables: 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒1 and 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2. User initiates a query and sends a request 
to the coprocessor. The coprocessor implemented by the module Sim_Secure_Coprocessor() 
generates a unique id for the user and calls the RSA key generating function in line 1 of the 
algorithm in Figure 23 to generate a key. It stores the Uid of the user in 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒1 as 
 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦1[ 𝑈𝑠𝑖][𝑈𝑖𝑑] and sends (Uid,key) to the user.  User then calls similar function to 
generate its own key, determines the desired information, and calls line 8 of the algorithm in 
Figure 23 to perform RSA encryption on the data. It then sends (Enc(Uid,loc,info),key) to the 
coprocessor, where Enc(Uid,loc,info) is the encrypted user query which contains user 
identification number, location, and information desired. Coprocessor receives the information 
and creates the process to perform the operation by calling “pthread_create(tid, NULL, 
&process, NULL)”. The coprocessor locks the process by executing pthread_mutex_lock() until 
after the thread execution. During the execution the coprocessor decrypts the information and 
checks if Uid exists in 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒1. If Uid exists it will store in 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2 the user information as 
(Uid,loc,info). The coprocessor uses the key derived from loc to read from Memory[i...] up to 
Memory[...k] where k is the length of data request sequence. The simplest way to emulate 





𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦[𝑘𝑒𝑦][𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜]; /∗  𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠1 ∗/ 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦[𝑘𝑒𝑦][𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜] = 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎; /∗  𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠2  ∗/ 
 
The array stores the key and data (POI). The key determines the path of the information to be 
read and processed.  
 
Figure 23 Encryption and decryption algorithm 
The coprocessor runs through the loop to look for user desired information, 
for(i=1;i<=sizeof(k);i++) (k is the size of data read from memory) save 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 in 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2 (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 
is the information read from memory). If 𝑞𝑖 = 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 continue to save 𝑞𝑖 in 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒2 till the end of 
the loop (𝑞𝑖 is the user desired information). For the first execution of the loop 
Sim_Secure_Coprocessor()  calls x=PAPI_get_real_cyc() to determine the amount of clock 
cycle for the operation. For the rest of the operation it uses the x amount of clock cycles for the 
execution. This satisfies the first oblivious condition. After streaming the entire path and 




remapped in a write operation. This satisfies the third condition. Application for each user query 
allocates separate address space that contains entire streamed path. The 
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c) is called at the end to release the resource and allow other threads to 
execute. This satisfies the second condition. A pending request is created and queued for any 
request prior to the expiration of the clock cycle. This will ensure that no two threads are granted 
access to the coprocessor at the same time. Performance is degraded by the wait, but it helps to 
enforce the oblivious condition. 
Using ns-3 node class we create three nodes for the secure coprocessor, the LBS server, 
and the user. We provide methods for managing the versions of the abstractions for all the nodes. 
We use specializations of class Application called UdpEchoClientApplication and 
UdpEchoServerApplication for data transmission between user and the secure coprocessor. The 
coprocessor tasks include: key management, encryption, data computation, data transfer, data 
read and write on the host memory. For encryption we implemented RSA since most existing 
commercial secure coprocessor already implements RSA. We use OpenSSL for the 
cryptographic functionality. The sample RSA algorithm shown in Figure 23 does the encryption 
and decryption process and returns the encrypted data.  
Processing SNNQ 
Suppose a user wants to receive the nearest POI to its location, the user and the coprocessor 




1. Initialization phase: User declares its intention for the nearest POI, the coprocessor 
creates address space for the user with a unique id and generates random key (𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑘𝑒𝑦 
and 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑦) following the guides provided in [72], and send 𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑘𝑒𝑦 to the user.  
2. User identifies its location and desired POI and creates query message 𝑞. User generates 
its own key (𝑢𝑝𝑢𝑘𝑒𝑦 and 𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑦) and encrypts the query using 𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑘𝑒𝑦 and sends 
( 𝑢(𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖
, 𝑞)𝑢𝑝𝑢𝑘𝑒𝑦) which contains the encrypted message and its own public key to 
the coprocessor. Only the coprocessor will be able to decrypt the message since it has 
the 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑦. If 𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑘𝑒𝑦 or 𝑢𝑝𝑢𝑘𝑒𝑦is compromised the attacker will still not be able to 
obtain any useful information. 
3.  The coprocessor uses 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑦 to decrypt the message, and saves it in the internal data 
structure. 
4. The coprocessor uses path ORAM to obtain from the server information desired by the 
user. It first identifies the key that relates to the user desired information. It streams the 
entire path looking for the block with correct record with 𝑂(log(𝑁)) search, where N is 
the total block size on the tree. If the number of blocks in a path is 𝑃𝑏𝑙𝑘 then for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤
𝑃𝐵𝑙𝑘 if 𝑗 = 𝑞𝑖 (𝑞𝑖 is the information desired by the user and stored in the block) it will 
save the information in the internal memory; otherwise,  it will discard the information 
with the same amount of work and time equal to the time to save it as in [7]. Each user 
thread owns the coprocessor the entire time; therefore, no other thread will be able to 




5. Once a path is accessed it is completely remapped to a new location according to process 
in [36]. The coprocessor sends to the user encrypted query response using 𝑢𝑝𝑢𝑘𝑒𝑦 
as 𝑐𝑝 (𝑢𝑝𝑢𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖
(𝑞𝑖)). It deletes the information from the internal memory. 
6. User upon receipt of the information decrypts it with its private key to find its nearest 
POI. The same process is repeated for subsequent queries 
Summary of Results 
We evaluate our design by emulating the secure coprocessor card. The host machine runs 
Ubuntu 9.04 with Intel i5-2540M CPU running at 2.60GHz and 4GB of RAM. The coprocessor 
capacity is based on working size of 4GB. Our script integrates with udpEechoClient and 
udpEechoServer module of the ns-3 network simulator. We evaluate the performance from the 
initialization phase with regards to response time and compare with software technique. For a 
fair comparison, we evaluate the software technique for the snapshot query on the same host 
machine running Ubuntu OS. We ignore all offline computations. The evaluation took into 
consideration all latencies caused by hardware emulation. Since the size of grid and object can 
have impact on performance, we examined two different objects and grid sizes. Table 4 shows 
the steps involved in each of the techniques compared excluding the offline phases. The comparison 
is based on the sequence of events (not necessarily similar) involved in the eventual retrieval of users 
nearest POI. For instance, in the hardware technique the coprocessor transmits the key to the user so 
user can encrypt the request. This is equivalent to server transmitting the entire grid to the user in the 




Comparing Response Time 
Table 5 shows the results for the two different approach when we compare the response 
time for n = 16 with k = 5, and n = 225 with k = 15 using 1024 bits key. The experiments show 
that the different n and k values have impact only on the software approach. It shows that the 
execution time using hardware approach is slightly over that of the software. However, while the 
time remains the same in all cases for the hardware approach, the same cannot be said of the 
software approach. We observe significant increase in cost for n = 225 with k = 15. The results 
show that software approach will be desirable over hardware when n is small, but as the size of n 
and k increases, hardware seems to be a better option than software technique. We deduced from 
the experiments that when it comes to initial transmission cost, the size of the area and object has 
impact on the software approach while there is no observable impact on hardware technique. The 
improvement observed in the hardware technique can partially be attributed to the fact that we 
are no longer hiding the object location or desired information to the server by sending the entire 
grid. Sending the entire grid proved to be costly as the size of the grid increases.  
Complexity 
We also conduct complexity analysis. Three design points affect complexity in the 
hardware approach. The first one is the external access to host memory (LBS server) through 
ORAM. In this face, coprocessor streams data from the database with 𝑂(𝑛), where n is the total 
size of record in the database. Since we implement path ORAM which streams only a subset of 




𝑂(log(𝑛))) over techniques like [66]. The second design point is remapping the entire database 
which takes 𝑂(𝑛). The third one is finding and encrypting user desired information. If the length 
of the key is p bits while f(p) is the computation function for the p bits and if each POI is m bit 
long, it will take the coprocessor (𝑂(log(𝑛)) + 𝑂(𝑛) + 𝑂(𝑓(𝑝)𝑚)) to search for user desired 
POI, remap the database, and run the encryption protocol. The equivalent process for the 
software approach takes 𝑂(2𝑓(𝑝)𝑘𝑚√𝑛). In general, tamper resistant hardware performs better 
than software approach as the size of the area and object increases.  
Table 4 Steps compared between hardware and software approach 
Tamper Resistant Hardware Software Cryptography 
Coprocessor generates key and sends to the user. Server sends grid and the POIs information to the user. 
User identifies its location and desired POI and creates 
query message. User generates its own key and 
encrypts the query using key from coprocessor. 
User finds the cell it belongs to and generates its own 
location data. For each neighborhood in user cell, user 
computes the absolute difference in the distance 
between neighborhood and its location. User 
randomly generates modulus N and query message 
and sent to the server. 
Coprocessor decrypts the message, and saves it in the 
internal data structure. 
 
Server runs PIR protocol on the user request, and for 
every column and row it computes two equations and 
returns 𝑍𝛼 to the user. 
Coprocessor engages path ORAM server to obtain 
information desired by the user. It first identifies the 
key that matches the location of the user; it then 
streams in the entire path looking for the block with 
correct record. 
User then determines 𝑍𝛼 value by computing equation 
6. 
Coprocessor completely remaps the path to a new 
location. 
 
User upon receipt of the information decrypts it with 






Table 5 Response time for software and hardware techniques 
 Response Time 
n = 16, k = 5 
Response Time 
n = 225, k = 15 
Tamper Resistant Hardware 2751ms 2751ms 





CHAPTER SIX: PRIVATE CONTINUOUS NEAREST NEIGHBOR 
QUERY  
In this chapter, we extend our privacy protecting technique to address user private 
information protection in continuous nearest neighbor query. Protecting user private information 
in a continuous nearest neighbor query poses different type of challenge compare to a snapshot 
nearest neighbor query. Nearest point of interest to a user may change based on the movement of 
the user and the point of interest. In some instances, only one object changes its position, while 
in some both objects change their position simultaneously. Figure 24 shows two depictions of a 
continuous nearest neighbor query where in (a) only the user location changes, and in (b) the 
location of user and point of interest changes. The first instance is referred to as moving query 
static object (MQSO), while the second is known as moving query moving object (MQMO). 
Examples illustrated in Figure 24 shows a user u located in location 𝑙1 with 𝑝1as the nearest POI. 
For MQSO in the top of the figure when u location changes from 𝑙1 to 𝑙3 the nearest POI changes 
to 𝑝6, while for MQMO in the bottom of the figure when u location changes from 𝑙1 to 𝑙3 the 
nearest POI is still 𝑝1due to the simultaneous movement of the user and the POI.  
The problem in a CNNQ is defined such that a user u and POI p located in location l 
contained in an area A at time T and moving at their own respective velocity v is at a new 
location l’ at a future time T’. If p is the nearest POI to u in l  located in A at time T then as the 
objects moves from l → l’ at time T → T’ private CNNQ shall continuously return to u the static 
or dynamic p located in A whose distance (d) from u ≤  ∀ 𝑝 located in A as u or p moves within 




Some of the suggested ideas for anonymity in CNNQ include issuing a query at every point of a 
line segment. However, it is very inefficient to issue a query at each point of a line segment as in 
SNNQ discussed in [16] and [73]. Chow and Mokbel in [37] suggested interesting idea based on 
cumulative cloaked region that prevent linking query to a specific user. This suggestion demands 
the presence of other users in the area which may cause some delays in issuing a query. We view 
the problem as one that can be represented as a continuous vector in a space.  
 
Figure 24 Moving query and static object (a) and Moving query and moving object (b) 
We propose plane partitioning using Voronoi diagram and continuous fractal space filling 
curve using Hilbert curve order to create nearest neighbor relationship within a path of 
movement such that upon a single query server will continuously update a user with the nearest 
POI as the user or the POI location changes within the path without giving up user private 
information. We treat user location as a function of time to project transition time interval within 
the path where nearest POI will change. Additionally, we extend the concept in MQMO-CNNQ 
to deal with moving POI. Specifically, we introduce the concept of update time which is when 




scales with the objects to help a user hide a location and relate it to information in the database. 
Finally, we execute private information retrieval protocol twice in the database to retrieve 
desired information.  
Solutions for MQSO-CNNQ and MQMO-CNNQ 
Our design strategy is to determine the next nearest neighbor to each of the POI in a path 
based on their proximity to one another by utilizing Voronoi diagram and Hilbert curve order. 
The distances between the points of interests is determined and used to determine where the 
nearest POI will change. Location of the objects within the spatial network is treated as a 
function of time, and the nearest POI will depend on the object velocity and elapsed time. A user 
issues a query to LBS server and specifies the time interval when the nearest POI will change. At 
each time interval the server will update the user with the nearest POI in the user’s path without 
the need for the user to issue another query as object location changes. To help understand our 
design, we first explain the different models and tools that were used in the design.  
Modelling Dynamic Object 
To account for the location of the objects at all time, we treat the position of the objects 
as a function of time. A spatial network (SN) consists of a user u and a POI p. Both objects are 
statically or dynamically restricted within the edges of the SN. If v is the velocity of a moving 
object (user) at a location 𝑙 ∈ 𝑆𝑁, then the object position after t time can be represented as  
𝑙𝑢(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑓(𝑣 ∗ 𝑡) (14) 




𝑙𝑝(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑓(𝑣 ∗ 𝑡) (15) 
 Where I in equations 14 and 15 represents the i-th location of a u and the p after time 𝑡𝑖, while t 
is the elapsed time.   
Note that v is a vector and therefore has magnitude and direction. From equations 14 and 15 we 
can see that it is possible for the same POI to be the nearest neighbor to a user at different places 
at different time in the same segment 𝑠𝑒̅̅̅̅ . 
We assume that a u and the p are contained in the same 𝑠𝑒̅̅̅. If we know 𝑙𝑢 and 𝑙𝑝 at time 𝑡𝑖 we 
will be able to determine the nearest POI to a user at all time in  𝑠𝑒̅̅̅̅ . This requires that server 
updates database information each time object location changes. 
Modelling Distance 
Finding distances between moving objects are challenging. A brute force approach can be 
used to calculate the distances. This approach is effective but inefficient. Work in [11] modelled 
distances of moving object with a directional weighted graph G(V,E), where V is the vertex and 
E is a single directed edge. If E is the empty set that contains no vertex and R is the set for all the 
single directed edges then all elements E ∈ R corresponds to a single directed edge. If we assign 
the edges weight w(vi , vi+1), the length of a path P ∀𝐸 ∈ 𝑅 is 
P =  ∑ 𝑤(𝑣𝑖 ,  𝑣𝑖+1)  (16) 
We use this approach to model distances between objects. We represent vertices as nodes (POIs), 
and the edges are the distances between the POIs. The distance between two POIs is the number 




is therefore defined as min w(P) for all paths between 𝑛𝑖and 𝑛𝑗, where 𝑛𝑖 and 𝑛𝑗 are the i-th and 
j-th node respectively. If a user u is located between path 𝑛𝑖, 𝑛𝑗  then, the nearest POI to the u is 
the POI with minimum w(P) from the user. The w(P) is represented as a time interval between 
the POIs. 
Indexing Continuous Nearest Neighbor Query 
As mentioned in [74], the result of a query q through a path contains a set < 𝑆𝑖, 𝑇𝑖 > 
tuples where 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑝1, 𝑝2⋯𝑝𝑘 is the ordered list of the POI (k is the number of POI in the query 
path), 𝑇𝑖 represents the time interval during which 𝑆𝑖 is the nearest POI to a user through the 
path. POIs are ordered by their increasing distance to u, i.e., 𝑝𝑖 is the closest POI to u, while 𝑝𝑖+1 
is the next closest POI to u, and 𝑝𝑘 is the k-th POI closest to u in the interval 𝑇𝑖,𝑇𝑖+1 and 𝑇𝑘, 
respectively. The returned sets through the path in the interval or segment 𝑠𝑒̅̅̅ satisfy the 
conditions: 
∪𝑖 𝑇𝑖 = [𝑡𝑠, 𝑡𝑒]  
and 
𝑇𝑖  ∩  𝑇𝑗 =  ∅, ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
where [𝑡𝑠, 𝑡𝑒] is the query interval divided into non-intersecting sub-intervals n in the 
intervals 𝑇𝑖 = [𝑡𝑠, 𝑡1] and 𝑇𝑛 = [𝑡𝑛−1, 𝑡𝑒] for (𝑡𝑠 < 𝑡1 < 𝑡𝑛−1 < 𝑡𝑒). The time stamps 






To help understand the proximity relationship between points in a plane, we provide an 
overview of Voronoi diagram. Voronoi diagram shown in Figure 25 is a way of dividing space 
into regions. It is a special kind of decomposition of a metric space determined by distances to a 
specified discrete set of objects in space. A set of spots is specified beforehand and for each spot 
there will be a corresponding region consisting of all points closer to that spot than to any other 
[15]. It is one of the most fundamental constructs defined by a discrete set of points [75] and 
[76]. Given a number of points in a plane Voronoi diagram divides the plane according to the 
nearest-neighbor rule, and each point is associated with the region of the plane closest to it. 
Aurenhammer in [77] defined Voronoi diagram in terms of dominance of two distinct 
points x and y. Let S denote a set of n points in a plane, for two distinct points 𝑥 and 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 the 
dominance of 𝑥 over 𝑦 is defined as the subset of the plane which is at least as close to 𝑥 as to 𝑦, 
i.e. 





Figure 25 Voronoi diagram showing 9 points of interest on a plane 
Therefore, 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑥, 𝑦) is a closed half plane bounded by a perpendicular bisector of 𝑥 and 𝑦. All 
points of the plane closer to 𝑥 are separated from the points in 𝑥 by this bisector termed the 
separator. The region of a point  𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 is the portion of the plane lying in all of the dominances 
of 𝑥 over the remaining points in S, i.e. 
𝑟𝑒𝑔(𝑥) = ⋂ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑦∈𝑆−𝑥}
 
As [77] stated, since the regions are coming from intersecting n – 1 half planes they are convex 
polygons. Therefore, the boundary of a region consists of at most n – 1 edge(s) (maximal open 
straight-line segments) and vertices (their endpoints). Each point on an edge is equidistant from 
exactly two points, and each vertex is equidistant from at least three points. As a result, the 
regions are edge to edge and vertex to vertex, i.e., they form a polygonal partition of the plane. 
Therefore, 𝑟𝑒𝑔(𝑥) cannot be empty since it contains all points of the plane at least as close to 𝑥 




Applying Voronoi Diagram  
We modelled our design after Network Voronoi Diagram (NVD). NVD as described in 
[75] and used in [43] has been extensively used to evaluate various spatial proximity queries 
[78]. Kolahdouzan in [79] implemented NVD similar to our work based on network distance 
where the results set were generated incrementally assuming all object to be static as noted in 
[11]. Okabe et al. in [75] defined NVD as specialized Voronoi diagram where objects location 
are restricted to the links that connect the nodes of the graph and the distance between objects are 
defined as the length of the shortest distance (shortest path or shortest time) in the network 
distance rather than Euclidean. In our work, we modelled the network as weighted graphs where 
the intersections are represented by nodes of the graph, and the roads are represented by the links 
connecting the nodes. The weights are the distances between the nodes that represent the time it 
takes to travel between the nodes assuming a constant velocity. We assume that all the POIs in a 
segment are pre-determined. For example, all the gambling centers from town A to town B are 
pre-determined.   
We map an area to a √𝑛  × √𝑛 grid and super-impose Voronoi diagram over the grid. All 
the POIs in the area are bounded to a cell in the grid. The contents of the cells represent the two 
endpoints of a query line segment 𝑠𝑒, where 𝑠𝑒 contains 𝑝1→𝑘 (k is the set of points in 𝑠𝑒) and 
dominance of 𝑝1 over 𝑝2 and dominance of 𝑝2 over 𝑝1 exist, i.e., 
𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑝1, 𝑝2) = {𝑥 ∈  𝑅
2|𝛿(𝑥, 𝑝1)  ≤  𝛿(𝑥, 𝑝2)} and 
𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑝2, 𝑝1) = {𝑥 ∈  𝑅
2|𝛿(𝑥, 𝑝2)  ≤  𝛿(𝑥, 𝑝1)} are true.  




a Voronoi cell are bounded to c. This leads to the heuristics from [16] and stated below. 
Heuristic HC2: For a given query segment 𝑠𝑒 𝑘𝑁𝑁(𝑠) = {𝑂𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘]} 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘𝑁𝑁(𝑒) =
{𝑂𝑒𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘]}, then {𝑂𝑠𝑖 , 𝑂𝑒𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘]} ⊆ 𝐶𝑘𝑁𝑁(𝑠𝑒). 
Since s and e are the two endpoints in the query line segment, the k points between these line 
segments are part of the answer set. 
Heuristic HC3: For a given query segment 𝑠𝑒 if 
𝑘𝑁𝑁(𝑠) = 𝑘𝑁𝑁(𝑒) = {𝑂𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘]}, then 𝑘𝑁𝑁(𝑠𝑒) = {𝑂𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑘]}. 
Proof: Following [80], for k=1 HC3 can be shown with Voronoi diagram. If Vor(𝑂𝑖) represents 
the Voronoi cell for object 𝑂𝑖 for any query point the object must be located within one Vor. 
Vor(𝑂𝑖) and object 𝑂𝑖 must be the nearest neighbor to that query point. As in Figure 25, the 
Voronoi diagram partitions the space into 9 parts based on the object positions. The area Vor(1) 
is the corresponding Voronoi cell for object 𝑂1, i.e., 𝑂1is the only nearest neighbor to any query 
point inside Vor(1). Based on the computational geometry in [80] Vors are convex. Since 
𝑘𝑁𝑁(𝑠) = 𝑘𝑁𝑁(𝑒) =  𝑂1 for k=1 both endpoints and the entire query line segment (𝑠𝑒) lie 
inside the Vor of object 𝑂1. Therefore, 𝑂1is the nearest neighbor to any query point along the 
query line segment. For every cell c of the grid server determines all Voronoi cell intersecting it 
and adds the corresponding object to c. Cell c contains all the potential nearest neighbor to a 
query through a path which we denote as set X. The cells are padded if necessary to create cells 
of equal size. All objects in M have equal bits (M is the matrix representation of the database 
information). The number of bits can be of any size so long as they are consistent in M to avoid 




Hilbert Space Filling Curve  
Hilbert curve order is used to map all the POIs in a c. It is a continuous fractal space 
filling curve that preserves spatial proximity [81]. If 𝐼 = {𝑡|0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1} represent the unit interval 
on a space and 𝑄 = {(𝑥, 𝑦)|0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 1} is the unit square as in [82], for each positive 
integer n the interval I is partitioned into 4
n 
subintervals of lengths 4
-n
 and the square Q into 4
n
 
sub-squares of sides 2
-n
. A one to one correspondence between the subintervals of I and sub-
squares of Q are constructed to meet the following conditions:  
Adjacency, adjacent subintervals correspond to adjacent sub-squares while sharing a common 
edge.  
Nesting, if at the n-th partition the subinterval 𝐼𝑛𝑘  corresponds to sub-square 𝑄𝑛𝑘 then at the 
(n+1)-st partition the 4 subintervals of 𝐼𝑛𝑘  must correspond to the 4 sub-squares of 𝑄𝑛𝑘 . 
Hilbert curve as shown in Figure 26 visits every point in n-dimensional grid space exactly 
once without crossing itself [73]. It is used for mapping multi-dimensional space to one-
dimensional space while still preserving locality [43]. For instance, if x and y are the coordinates 
of a point within the unit square and d is the distance along the curve when it reaches that point, 
the points that have nearby d values will also have nearby (x, y) values [83]. That is, if two points 
are close in the 2-D space they are likely to be close in the Hilbert ordering as well. Analysis by 





Figure 26 Hilbert Curve of (a) order 1 and (b) order 2 
Applying Hilbert Type Space Filling Curve 
After we bind all POIs to c using Voronoi diagram, we map all POIs in c using Hilbert 
curve order. All the points 𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑋 for i from 1 to k in the intervals I are mapped to Hilbert Curve 
order as in [43] and partially in [85] such that a one to one correspondence between the 
subintervals of I and sub-squares of Q satisfy adjacency and nesting conditions which determines 
a continuous function 𝑤𝑓 that maps I onto Q [82].  
Following [82], a one way function 𝑤𝑓  𝐼 → 𝑄 is stated as follows: 
1.  If there is 𝑡 ∈ 𝐼 which is not the endpoint of any subintervals of I then there is a t 
which is part of a closed nested subintervals{ 𝐽𝑢 }1
∞ one from each partition with 
lengths approaching zero. A unique point 𝑝 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2} ∈ 𝑄 is determined by the 
corresponding sequence of closed nested squares { 𝑆𝑢 }1
∞ with a diameter that 




2. If for some value u, for instance, u=v, 𝑡 ∈ 𝐼 is common to two adjacent 
intervals 𝐽𝑢, 𝐽𝑢
′ , then ∀𝑢 ≥ 𝑣, t is common to two adjacent intervals 𝐽𝑢, 𝐽𝑢
′  and 
therefore belong to two nested sequences { 𝐽𝑢 }𝑣
∞ and {𝐽𝑢
′ }1
∞. The corresponding 
sequences of squares {𝑆𝑢}𝑣
∞ and {𝑆𝑢
′ }𝑣
∞ determine the same point 𝑝 ∈ 𝑄 since the 
squares are adjacent and their diagonals approach zero [82]. For such t we 
define 𝑤𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑝. To show that the function  𝑤𝑓 is continuous, if |𝑡1 − 𝑡2| ≤ 4
−𝑢 
then 𝑡1and 𝑡2 must lie on the same interval or in two adjacent intervals of the u-th 
partition. The corresponding images should be in the adjacent squares that form a 
rectangle with sides 2−𝑢 and 2 ∙ 2−𝑢. 
Therefore, 
‖𝑤𝑓(𝑡1) − 𝑤𝑓(𝑡2)‖ ≤ √5 ∙ 2
−𝑛  (17) 
Since there is a correspondence between points in the intervals and squares, all the points are 
assigned Hilbert values. Remember that all the points in a path are contained in one cell of the 
grid. For a path with 9 POIs c will contain 9 POIs, and all POIs are assigned Hilbert value H 
based on their distance to one another. For example, points 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4 have H values of 5, 15, 
20, and 10 respectively. Points with closer values are closer in space. 
Database Design 
We transform the H values which represents set of points in a multi-dimensional space 
into records in a database akin to [86] . Queries on the records are queries on the sets of points 




M, and we use R-tree data structure for the geometric data storage. R-tree is the most widely 
used geometric data structure suitable for storage on a disk [87]. The idea is to group nearby 
objects and represent them with minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) in the next higher level of 
the tree and have nodes of high degree that fit exactly into one block. The bounding rectangle is 
used to determine whether or not to search inside a sub-tree. Figure 27 depicts one-level R-tree 
with nodes of size 3. Each key value is greater or equal to the values in the left node which are 
Hilbert’s. The index key is the maximum Hilbert value in the segment concatenated with the cell 
id so that when a user identifies its cell the user can then use the value to determine which query 
set belongs to its path. R-tree performs very well and has a linear worst case scenario. It was 
shown in [88] that R-tree on n-points in d-dimensional space will visit Ω((𝑛 𝐵⁄ )1−1 𝑑⁄ + 𝑔 𝐵⁄ ) 
blocks, where 𝑔 is the number of query answers. A version shown in [89] called PR tree was said 
to achieve the same bound when the stored objects and query objects are axis-parallel hyper-
rectangles [80]. Readers interested in R-tree structure can read [90]. 
 





The cells are identified by the cell id, and each cell contains k POI in the segment 𝑠𝑒 representing 
the path of travel by a user. Each cell contains equal k and is padded if necessary to prevent 
server inference from number of k transmitted. Stored in the database with the POIs are the 
weights w which represent the average distance between adjacent POIs in 𝑠𝑒 which will be used 
to determine the split or the transition point which will indicate the point where the nearest POI 
to a user will change. 
Processing MQSO-CNNQ 
The following steps will be followed to answer MQSO-CNNQ:  
Step 1: Following the process described above server creates location data record in the database 
represented with R-tree geometric data storage where the keys are the maximum Hilbert value 
for the segment. 
Step 2: User in location l initiates a query to obtain the nearest POI along a path of interest. 
Server sends the grid, the key, k (number of POI available for a segment as stored in the 
database), and the average distance 𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔 between the POIs. Each segment 𝑠𝑒 has its own 𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔.  
Note: It is assumed that the POIs are approximately equidistance from one another, and that the 
time interval where the nearest neighbor change occurs can be averaged to a uniform value such 
that the average time interval 𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 represents the transition time for all p from 𝑝1, 𝑝2, ⋯ , 𝑝𝑘 in 
each segment represented in the grid for a known constant velocity v. If 𝑑𝑖 is the distance of 
travel before the nearest neighbor changes from 𝑝𝑖 to 𝑝𝑗, for 𝑖 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 server computes the 









 (18)  









 (19)  
where k is the number of objects in the path. 
Step 3: User receives the grid together with the parameters and identifies the cell it belongs to. 




 as shown in algorithm of Figure 28. Using the key user will then request all the POI 
contained in the set left of the key. For instance, if the key of interest to a user is 60 the user will 
request the values 40, 50 and 60, Figure 27. Following the same principle as in snapshot query 
with a database 𝑠 = √𝑛 user will generate query message 𝑦 = ( [𝑦1, 𝑦2, ⋯ , 𝑦𝑠]
𝑘) and 𝑥 =
([𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑠]
𝑘) each targeting the 𝑘𝑡ℎ element in the segment 𝑠𝑒, where k is the number of 
POI contained in the path such that 
𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑄𝑁𝑅, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑏, 𝑦𝑗 ∈ 𝑄𝑅 
and 
𝑥𝑎 ∈ 𝑄𝑁𝑅, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀𝑟 ≠ 𝑎, 𝑥𝑟 ∈ 𝑄𝑅 





Figure 28 User computing the transition time and creating query message 
Step 4: Using algorithm of Figure 29 server will run PIR protocol on user request and creates a 
size k FIFO queue data structure of 𝑍𝛼. The server adds an item to the queue in the order 
represented on the tree, i.e., the closest neighbor to the user from the point of origin (closest 
Hilbert value) is added first in that order until the farthest neighbor. Server returns the first 𝑍𝛼  to 
the user. Using the same method as in snapshot query user decrypts server cryptic response to 
reveal its nearest neighbor. At each 𝑡𝑡 interval server will update user with the next value in the 
queue until the end of the segment or user terminates the query. Upon receipt of a nearest 
neighbor user determines the validity of the nearest neighbor by using its position and a flag with 
a value of true or false. For instance, when server updates the user with the nearest neighbor at 
the user specified interval, in order for it to be the nearest neighbor user must reach the transition 
point which will result in setting the flag to false, otherwise, if the flag is true (meaning user has 
not reached the transition point, previous POI is still valid) user caches the nearest neighbor 




point where the nearest neighbor will change. User only decrypts server response if the flag is set 
to false. The flag will ensure that any deviation by the user from the expected travel pattern will 
not result in false positive. 
 
Figure 29 Server running PIR protocol and responding to user request. 
Processing MQMO-CNNQ 
 We modified our design to address MQMO-CNNQ. In MQSO-CNNQ we used R -tree 
indexing to help speed up searching and improve performance since objects location is static 
throughout the life of a query and therefore updates are deemed infrequent. This condition does 
not hold for moving object where updates are frequent due to changes in object locations. 
Moving object database need to accommodate frequent updates while simultaneously allowing 
efficient query processing [91]. A study was done in [92], design issues were considered for 




complimentary and can be used in parallel. Query index approach rather than object index was 
used in [93] to avoid the constraints imposed on the speed or path of the moving object. Time 
parameterized R-tree was used in [94] which were based on using current and anticipated future 
positions of moving objects. Similar method based on B+ -tree was used in [95] where the 
indexed data in the tree are no longer points, but rather linear functions and the time of update. In 
the method, updates are only performed if the function predicted position is considered 
inaccurate [96]. While it is possible to get by with predicted object position for a short duration 
of a query life, it may not suffice for the entire query existence. 
 We implement B+ -tree similar to [95]. We use B+ -tree to allow efficient update and 
access to object information. Because of its support for linearization and indexing [91] stated that 
B+ -tree is more appropriate to model moving object. If at time T object is at location 𝑙0 and the 
same object is at location 𝑙′0 at time T’ then the distance moved by the object can be modelled as 
 𝑑𝑚 = 𝑓(𝑣 ∗ 𝑡) (20)  
where 𝑣 ≥ 0 is the velocity of the moving object, while t is the elapsed time. Figure 30 shows 
partial B+ -tree index structure and the matrix M = √𝑛 × √𝑛 representation of database D for 
k=4. The values in the leaf node shown in the figure are the Hilbert values for the objects. 
The process is similar to static object query. Like in the static object query we create 
Voronoi diagram using the set of objects and super-impose a regular grid of √𝑛 × √𝑛 on top of 
the Voronoi diagram. Using Hilbert Curve ordering we create a one to one correspondence 
between the subintervals of I and sub-squares and then assigns Hilbert value to the objects based 




created. The index key is the Hilbert value concatenated with the cell id. All the objects in 𝑠𝑒̅̅̅ are 
therefore within the range of minimum and maximum Hilbert value for the 𝑠𝑒̅̅̅. The objects are 
modelled as a linear function of time and therefore the data to be indexed are no longer point 
representation of Hilbert value, but rather linear functions. The internal nodes serve as a 
directory, and each has a pointer to the right sibling. Stored in the leaf node are the velocity, the 
location, and id of the object. All objects are assumed to have constant velocity. Objects location 
from time 𝑇 → 𝑇′ is determined based on the stored velocity. Objects update their velocity when 
a change in velocity occurs; otherwise, no updates are required. This will prevent unnecessary 
updates. 
 
Figure 30 B+ tree index representation of database matrix and 𝑍𝛼array for k=4 with pointer 
at 𝑍𝛼[3]. 
As in static object query, transition time is determined. This is the time or point where the 




where each time tick is the update time 𝑡𝑢, i.e., the time the server updates database information. 
At each 𝑡𝑢 ≅ 𝑡𝑡 server computes 𝑙′0. If there is no Δ𝑣 there will be no update from user. Server 
will use the stored v to determine object location. 
The following steps will be followed to answer MQMO-CNNQ. 
Step 1: Server creates nearest neighbor record following the same procedure as in MQSO and 
builds B+ -tree geometric database storage of the POIs. 
Step 2: User initiates a query to obtain nearest neighbor along its path. Server sends the grid, the 
key, k (number of POI available for a segment as stored in the database), and the average 
distance 𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔 between the POIs. We also assume that no new object enters the segment after 
query initiation, therefore k does not change. 
Step 3: User receives the grid together with the parameters and identifies the grid it belongs to. 
Focusing on the grid it belongs to user finds the transition time using its velocity and 𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔. User 
will then request all the objects contained in the range up to key maximum. Following the same 
principle used in the MQSO with a database 𝑠 = √𝑛 user generates query message 𝑦 =
( [𝑦1, 𝑦2, ⋯ , 𝑦𝑠]
𝑘) and 𝑥 = ([𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑠]
𝑘) each targeting the 𝑘𝑡ℎ element in the segment 𝑠𝑒, 
where k is the number of objects contained in the path such that 
𝑦𝑏 ∈ 𝑄𝑁𝑅, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑏, 𝑦𝑗 ∈ 𝑄𝑅 
                                                                            and 




User sends 𝑡𝑡 to the server together with the query message.  
Step 4: Server runs PIR protocol on user request and with equations 3 and 4 computes 𝑍𝛼. It then 
creates array of size k for 𝑍𝛼 in the order shown in Figure 30b. Initially, the pointer points to j=0. 
Server sends to the user the value at j=0. At each subsequent 𝑡𝑢 ≅ 𝑡𝑡, server updates the database 
with current order of object location for the 𝑠𝑒. Server will again create array of size k for 𝑍𝛼  and 
shifts the pointer to j+1 and send the value at j+1 to the user. If the flag is set to false which 
indicates that the transition point has been reached the user will again decrypt the message, 
otherwise, user caches the server response. Server continues the same process of recreating array 
of 𝑍𝛼 at each 𝑡𝑢 and each time shifting the pointer by 1 until the last k object is sent to the user or 
the user terminates the query.  
Analysis and Results 
 The process for MQSO and MQMO are the same for the most part, therefore, our 
experimental evaluation represents the analysis of both schemes. We present the evaluation with 
respect to transmission time and complexity. For the server transmission time we simulate and 
compare different k values, were k is the number of POI in a path. We also simulate and compare 
different n (n is the size of the grid) in order to understand optimal parameters. Next, we 
compare user transmission time while changing k and n. We also vary the size of modulus used 
in the PIR protocol. We then implement the design of [15] and compare the response time with 





The application was developed in C++. The server and client experiment was conducted on ns-3 
simulator running on Ubuntu 9.04 Linux variant  operating system with intel-quad-core 
processor operating at 2.66GHz with 256MB RAM. The server communication with the access 
point runs a CSMA protocol with data rate of 100Mbps and 6500ns channel delay. Client 
communication is wifi 802.11a standard with a stream data rate of 54Mbps and a default constant 
speed propagation delay representing the propagation speed of light in the vacuum. Maximum 
packet size is 2304 bytes including the headers. The actual payload is 1450 bytes. The access 
point (AP) share the same type of Physical level and channel attributes as the client wifi device 
which we defaulted to ns3 values. The AP is stationary while the client is mobile and randomly 
wonders around at a random speed in a bounded box defined by x and y coordinates. We varied 
the grid size from 16 up to 225. For the objects we use Sequoia points in [97] which contain 
62,556 California place names. We use 768 and 1,536 bits for the modulus. Shown in Table 6 are 
the rest of the parameter settings. 
Transmission Time 
First, we simulate the time it takes the server to transmit the packets using different 
values of k as n changes from 16 upwards to 225. The result is shown in Figure 31. The 
experiment shows that for small n such as n = 16, k has no significant impact on the transmission 
cost. However, as n increases the impact of k becomes noticeable. When k =5 the increase in the 




cost took a sharp increase. When k = 10 and 15 the sharp increase in the transmission time occurs 
sooner at n = 64. What this means is that when k =5 increase in n up to 144 will produce a more 
desirable result, while for k = 10 and 15 increase in n up to 64 will produce better result. 
Table 6 Parameter Settings 
Parameters Settings 
Packet Transmission Interval 1 second 
Spatial Object Size 80 - 3375 
Object Size 10kB 
Query Size 100 Bytes 
 
 





Figure 32 shows the time for the server to transmit its packets for the three different 
values of k and n.  From the experiment we made the following observations: First, when n is 
small such as n = 16 the impact to transmission time is less significant as k increases. Second, 
when n increases to 64 the cost for transmitting the packets takes a sharp increase at k = 10. 
Third, when n increases to144 the transmission time increase is very minimal. What this means 
is that in the first observation, for an area with high concentration of k we can create a bigger cell 
to accommodate more k which will result in reducing the size of n in order to have little or no 
impact to the transmission cost. For the second observation, when n increases up to 64, k > 10 
will have significant increase in transmission cost. Therefore it will be more desirable to reduce 
the size of n, for instance n = 16 and k >10 will be more desirable. In the third observation, for n 
= 144 the proportionality of the increase is less when k > 10 than when k < 10. This means that 
the design will still maintain acceptable performance when n is large and k > 10.  
 





 We conduct experiments to determine the cost for the user to transmit the request to the 
server. Figure 33 shows the result for three values of k (5, 10, and 15) and n (16, 64, and 144) 
with modulus N set to 768 bits. We observe negligible increase in transmission cost for n = 16 
for all three k values. We also simulate and compare the time increase for the three k values 
when n is set to 64 and 144, and we observe a larger proportion of time increase when n is set 
to144 than when n is 64. The observation here is that it will be more desirable to make k as small 
as possible when n is inevitably large. For an area with large concentration of k we can make n as 
small as possible while making k large to achieve better result. 
 
Figure 33 Client Transmission time with 96 Bytes Modulus and k = 5, 10, and 15 
 We also compare the cost for a user to transmit its request to the server using different k 
and n values. As the results in Figure 34 shows, the transmission cost impact is minimal when n 
is small for three different k values. However, we start seeing significant difference as n 
increases. The difference is more noticeable when n is greater than 144. The significance of this 




to keep n small when k is large, and when k is small n can be large without adding significant 
cost to a user.  
 
Figure 34 Client Transmission time with 96 Bytes Modulus and n from 16 to 225 
 Also, as an alternative and for added security we increase the modulus N to 1536 bits and 
the results are shown Figure 35. We used it on three values of k (5, 10, 15) and n (16, 64 144) 
and compare the transmission cost with 768 bit modulus. We did not observe any significant 
increase in the transmission cost for small sizes of n and k. For instance, when n is 16 and k is set 
to 5 the cost is 437ms for 768 bits, and 558ms for 1536 bits. When k increases to 15 and n stays 
the same the cost is 679ms for 768 bits, and 1327ms for 1536 bits. The difference between 768 
bits and 1536 bits for k = 5 and k = 15 starts to narrow as n gets larger. Nevertheless, the size of 
N together with k and n has impact on the cost. This offers privacy and efficiency tradeoff 
opportunity for a user. For instance, a user searching for nearest gas station may have minimal 




special need medical facility which may prioritize privacy over efficiency and therefore chooses 
larger N.  
 
Figure 35 Client Transmission time showing impact of 192 Bytes Modulus and k = 5, 10, and 15 
Complexity 
 We analyze server and user computation complexity and compare with [5]. The results 
are shown in Table 7. As already stated the database is of size √𝑛 𝑥√𝑛, and each cell content is 
k*m bit long. The length of the modulus is P bits, and f(P) is the computation function for the P 
bit. Our scheme shows improvement over [5] in the user communication when √𝑛 > 𝑘. Our 
technique has downside in the server computation which is caused by the double PIR. 
Nevertheless, the reduction in the server transmission and user computation cost due to the 
double PIR makes up for the downside. Since √𝑛 is likely to be greater than k our scheme will 




Table 7 Computation complexity for Server and Client 
Type Our Scheme Previous Scheme 
User Communication 𝑂(2𝑃𝑘𝑚) 𝑂(𝑃𝑚√𝑛) 
User Computation 𝑂(𝑓(𝑃)𝑘𝑚) 𝑂(𝑓(𝑃)𝑚√𝑛) 
Server Communication 𝑂(𝑃𝑘𝑚) 𝑂(𝑃𝑚√𝑛) 
Server Computation 𝑂(2(𝑓(𝑃)𝑘𝑚√𝑛)) 𝑂(𝑓(𝑃)𝑘𝑚√𝑛) 
 
Comparison with Previous Technique 
We conduct experiments to compare our design with the design of [15]. Table 8 shows 
the steps involved in the two techniques. We did not consider offline activities, i.e., events that 
happens prior to a user declaring her intention for the nearest neighbor. Such events includes: 
creating a square grid, super-imposing Voronoi diagram over the grid, and mapping all the POI 
to Hilbert value. In the case of [15] this activity will be using Voronoi to divide road network 
into cells with centered Central Server (CS). Both designs were implemented in ns3 simulator. 
We implemented [15] based on author’s description, the algorithm provided, and as we 
understood it. The design as described in [15] involves a three-way process. Using Voronoi 
graph the authors partitions the entire area into cells each centered with a CS. A user receives 
several broadcasting messages from neighboring CSs and determines the cell she is heading to. 
The user computes the distances between each CS and herself and registers to the CS with 
minimum distance from her. Registration information includes user location, destination, and 
history velocity. After successful registration to a CS the user will report the location 
periodically to the CS and drops broadcasting messages from the CS until the user gets out of the 




history velocity. It then organizes k users to form a cooperative k-anonymity group according to 
the user’s moving trend. CS takes its own location and a neighbor CS location which the user is 
heading to as two elementary anchors and chooses other continuous anchors in the line segment 
between them. CS picks an anchor from anchor sequence to replace user’s location and 
send a snapshot query of a continuous query request with k queries to LBS Provider (LSP). 
The LSP uses the anchor point to perform incremental nearest neighbor search (INN) and returns 
its results to the CS. The CS then refines the result and then returns k-POI to the user.  
For comparison we measure the response time (i.e., from initialization to the time user 
receives the POI). We use the same travelling path in simulating the two designs. We compare 
the time for the initial response and then subsequent responses until query terminates. For the 
client and server applications in ns3 we use same parameters as in our previous experiment 
described earlier in this chapter. We compare the work of [15] with three different sizes of 
modulus that we used for encryption in our technique. Table 9 shows the results. As the results 
show, initially, as the size of modulus increases, [15] performs better. However, our design 
performs better throughout the life of the query as the user continuously receives nearest POI. 
We believe that one of the contributing factors to the high cost of [15] is due to the fact that the 
design is basically a snapshot query rolled into a continuous query. Almost similar operations are 
performed throughout the segment by both client and server. In our design after the initial 
operation server queues the k-POI and sends a single POI to the user at every transition time 
interval without the user issuing another query. Also, another downside of [15] is the k-
anonymity requirement. There are chances that a query may never be answered if it did not 




Table 8 Steps in CNNQ for the compared technique 
Our Design Previous Design 
User initiates a query CSs sends out broadcasting messages 
Server sends the grid, the key, k, and 𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔  to the user User receives several neighbor CS broadcasting 
messages, and determines the cell she is heading to, 
and then computes the distance between each CS and 
herself, then register to CS with minimum distance 
from her 
User identifies the cell it belongs to and uses its v to 
find 𝑡𝑡 where the nearest neighbor change will occur. 
Using the key user will generate query messages each 
targeting the 𝑘𝑡ℎ element in the path. 
CS computes all the neighboring cell’s weight for a user 
using history velocity of the user and stores them in 
prediction set in ascending order 
Server runs PIR protocol on user request, and then 
creates a size k FIFO queue data structure of Z_α. The 
server adds items to the queue in the order it was 
represented in the tree. Closest Hilbert value is added 
first in that order until the farthest neighbor. Server 
returns the first Z_α to the user. 
CS takes its own location and a neighbor CS location 
which the user is heading to as two elementary 
anchors and chooses other continuous anchors in the 
line segment between them. CS organizes k users to 
form a cooperative k-anonymity group according to 
their moving trends and sends k queries to LSP. 
At each 𝑡𝑡 interval server will update user with the next 
value in the queue until the end of the segment or user 
terminates the query 
CS sends each snapshot query of continuous query 
request with an anchor which the user has not passed 
yet.  
User then determine 𝑍𝛼 value by computing equation 
6 
CS performs Singoes algorithm to compute results for a 
user according to candidate sets returned from LSP 
 
Table 9 Comparing response time using different modulus in our work with previous technique 






Response Time (s) 
 
Previous Design  
Initial Response 
Time (s) 
Previous Design  
Subsequent 
Response Time (s) 
k=10, n=144, 
N=768bits 
3.536 0246 4.283 4.283 
k=10, n=144, 
N=1024bits 
5.130 0360 4.283 4.283 
k=10, n=144, 
N=2048bits 






Analysis of Large Prime on PIR Protocol 
Private information retrieval protocol is based on the computational intractability of a 
large prime. Two large prime p and q are multiplied to produce modulus N. Some of the existing 
proposal for PIR encryption in LBS is performed with 768 bits modulus. However, the discovery 
in December of 2009 renders 768 bits encryption obsolete. A team of mathematicians, computer 
scientists, and cryptographers were able to deduce the two prime numbers that when multiplied 
produces 768 bits (232 digits) number using number field sieve (NFS) (identifying appropriate 
integers). The polynomial selection took half a year on 80 processors which represents 3% of the 
task. The sieving took more than two years on several hundreds of machines with more than 10
20 
operations (equivalent to 1500 years of computing on a single core 2.2GHz AMD Opteron) [98]. 
The previous record was the May 2005 factorization of 663-bit 200-digit number [99]. Though 
not many individual will have access to these types of clusters; however, this may be trivial for 
many corporations. The team stated that the overall effort is so low that 768 bit is no longer 
recommended for the protection of even data of little value. They also stated that factoring 768 
bit is about several thousand times harder than 512 bit, and they expect factoring 1024 bit to be 
about a thousand times harder than 768 bit. There are so many prime numbers of the same size 
and below in a given key length. Therefore, factoring the key is directly proportional to the key 
length. ECRYPT II [100] recommendation on key length shown in Table 10 is based on desired 
security level and expected life-span. We conduct experiment using different key sizes to analyze 




Table 10 Recommended minimal key sizes based on security level 
Protection Modulus (N) Bits 
Smallest general purpose level (2015-2015) 1248 
Legacy standard level (2015-2020) 1776 
Medium term protection (2015-2030) 2432 
Long term protection (2015-2040) 3248 
Foreseeable future 15424 
 
Experimental Results 
In this section, we present the results of the experiment conducted in LBS nearest 
neighbor query using different key sizes. The algorithm was implemented in c/c++ languages 
running on Window 7 machine with win64 OpenSSL version 1.0.2. We examine the 
computation cost on the user and the server to understand the tradeoff between performance and 
security. For the experiment we use five different modulus 512 bits (78 digits), 768 bits (116 
digits), 1024 bits (155 digits), 2048 bits (309 digits) and 4096 bits (617 digits). We use the 
BN_generate_prime_ex() of the openssl to generate the prime numbers. For measuring time we 
averaged 100 runs. We first examine the impact on the user. We measure the computation time 
for the user to generate the modulus N which it then sends to the server together with the query 
message so that we can observe the impact of different key sizes. The result is shown in Figure 
36. The figure shows increase in execution time as the size of the key increases, and increases 





Figure 36 User creating a query message with modulus N 
We also conduct experiment to determine the execution time on the server for running 
PIR protocol on different sizes of n when the modulus N is set to 512 bits. The observation 
shown in Figure 37 shows the impact of n on PIR protocol. The result shows that when n is small 
the impact on the execution time is minimal, but the execution time increases as n increases.  
 





We also conduct experiment to determine the computation cost on the server for running 
PIR protocol on user query using different sizes of N. As Figure 38 shows, we did not observe 
significant increase in the execution time for the same value of n as N increases. The size of n 
definitely has impact on the cost especially as n increases, however, for the same n, the impact is 
minimal. We also observe that increasing the size of the key has more impact on the user than 
the server. Based on this observation we recommend that key size should be chosen based on 
user privacy requirement. 
 




CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we explore techniques to protect user private information in location-
based services nearest neighbor query. We provide solutions for snapshot nearest neighbor query 
and continuous nearest neighbor query models. In each model, we present theoretical concepts 
and the design implementations, and we perform experiments to show the applicability. In 
SNNQ we use space mapping technique to create neighborhood for each point of interest in an 
area by using the concept of sets in a topological space. The design allows a user in a location 
contained in an area to relate the location with the position of the information in the database 
which is represented as a square matrix. We provide database that scales with the size of the 
objects in the area which allows a user to relate the position with location of information in the 
database and for scalability. A user requests from the server a specific POI based on the location. 
Server runs private information retrieval protocol twice on the data to prevent database from 
learning user requested information, and the server releases to the user the only requested 
information. The server is not able to unmask the user personal information due to computational 
intractability of a large prime. We provide statistical analysis of our design with respect to 
complexity and execution time. Our experimental analysis shows an efficient scheme that 
provides great architecture for scaling. 
To address the slow response time of the CPU observed in our snapshot query with the 
increase in the size of the grid and objects in the area, we adopt parallel implementation of our 




compare the execution time of the CPU serial implementation against GPU-CUDA parallel 
implementation. GPU shows speedup over CPU. Improvement obtained in the GPU shows the 
impact of the massive parallelism achievable in GPU. We study parameter tuning and its impact 
on run time and provide analysis that can be leveraged by researchers of parallel programming 
using GPU and CUDA API. We provide analysis for choosing thread and block size. Finally, we 
provide a model for predicting GPU execution time. 
As an alternative, we explore the viability of a hardware in providing data privacy by 
using secure coprocessor in processing private location-based services snapshot nearest neighbor 
query. We create data structures and applications in the coprocessor to allow for oblivious 
computation. We then utilize ORAM to access external memory. We perform experiment by 
emulating the secure coprocessor to determine network transmission cost and complexity, and 
we compare the design with the software approach. Hardware approach shows an improvement 
over software approach as the size of the object and grid increases. The cost for the secure 
coprocessor remains constant in all cases while in the software approach the cost is related to the 
size of the object and grid.  
We then extend our privacy solution to continuous nearest neighbor query by addressing 
moving query static object and moving query moving object types of queries. For our design, we 
combine Voronoi diagram and Hilbert curve order to create object relationships and proximity. 
The technique allows a user to determine the transition point at which to receive the next nearest 
neighbor POI from the server based on the velocity. It also allows a user to authenticate server 




transmission time, and the results show efficient and scalable design. We conduct experiments 
on the response time and compare with similar technique. The results show that our design 
reduces the response time. We also perform complexity analysis and compare with similar 
design as applicable. The results for the most part show improvement over similar design. 
Finally, we conduct analysis on effect of large prime on PIR protocol. The results show that 
increasing the size of the key has more impact on the user than the server; nevertheless, size of 
the grid has impact on the server since we observe increase in response time as the grid size 
increases. 
 Ways for increasing computational capabilities of machines continue to evolve, a single 
approach alone may no longer be sufficient to offer information protection. Hybrid approach that 
combines hardware and software may provide better alternative. Advance in computing 
technology will always help the good and the bad guys. Cat and Mouse game will always exist 
between cryptographers and adversaries. What might be secure today may no longer be secure 
tomorrow; therefore, any security design is time relative. 
Future Work 
In a moving query moving object continuous nearest neighbor query, we encounter 
frequent updates due to change in object position. The constant change in position results in 
frequent computation to determine current nearest neighbor to a user. One can improve on this to 
reduce the response time by introducing parallelization through GPU-CUDA interface to the 
continuous nearest neighbor query. A design that will allow each thread to independently handle 




mapping are some of the task that can be explored with GPU computation. Each scalar processor 
can be assigned subsets of the grid, and the threads can be created to handle individual object 
computation.  
Another direction for future work will be to incorporate into location-based services 
nearest neighbor query the four basics primitives of cryptography [101], i.e., integrity (access 
only to authorized users), confidentiality (detecting tampered information on transit), 
authentication (Ensuring message origin), and non-repudiation (un-deniability of action). 
In the protocol designed for the secure processor we use RSA encryption. The security of 
RSA keys rests on the difficulty of factoring the product of two large prime. However, though 
extremely difficult, breakthrough in the past few years has shown that products of two large 
prime can be determined through number field sieve. Also RSA is said to be vulnerable to Shor’s 
algorithm. One can explore NTRU as an alternative to RSA. It is based on the algebraic structure 
of polynomial rings and it is said to be safe from Shor’s algorithm attack. The hard problem is 
based on the short vector problem (finding a short vector in a lattice) [102]. To create the key, 
two chosen polynomials must satisfy the additional requirement that it has inverses modulo q and 
modulo p. NTRU technique can be used to generate the key. Anybody interested in NTRU can 
read [102].  
Another area worth exploration is the power consumption. Mobile device has limited 
power supply at any given time, possible directions for future work will include energy 




determine variations in energy consumption due to the design, and protocol like TailEnder [103] 
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